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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § § 7 8 A-3 -102.(3)(j)
and 78A-4-103(2)G) (2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the fraud based claims in Plaintiffs'

361-page Second Amended Complaint for failure to plead ihe ek ar and concise
particularity required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion
to dismiss for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 IIT App 339, \ 15,1\- -s :-a y /t.
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining, based on the facts

affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims relating to the
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property i ouUi not
proceed in equity and good conscience in the absence of Kxn Dolezsar's estate under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's determination nuclei Rule
19 for abuse of discretion. Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 7*7 P .M l)4 i, 944 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
III.

1 )id the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud based

claims without leave to amend?
Standard of Review: This Court review s the trial court's denial of leave to amend
for abuse of discretion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, ^ 14, 87
P.3d734.
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.

Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs' civil claims for aiding and

abetting?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion
to dismiss for correctness. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, If 15, 79 P.3d 974.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
I.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides:
Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be averred generally.

II.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend its pleading only by leave of court or
by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period
may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.

III.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)-(b) provides :
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would

2
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render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the
action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not Feasible. If a person as
described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The facts to be considered by
the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
The claims in this case alleged by Appellants Leslie D. Mower, LD SQ, LLC, LD
III, LLC, LD Purpose, LLC, andNavona, LC (collectively, "Plaintiffs") primarily arise
from two real property developments: a condominium development on the island of
Kauai in Hawaii (the "Hawaii Development") and an up-scale residential subdivision in
Mapleton, 11 ta! 1 c a 11 e< 1"111 c Preserve at Mapleton (the "Mapleton Development"). I n 11 I ei r
361-page Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted 4X unisex of action, including,
among others, claims for breach of contract, quasi contract, unjust enrichment, breach of
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent
nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, negligent misrepresentation,
conspiracy, violation of the Utah Pattern of \ hikm fit! Activity Act, and conversion.
Plaintiffs originally filed this lawsuit on October 20, 2009. (R. 461.) After
motions to dismiss were filed by multiple defendants, Plaintiffs filed a I irst \mended
3
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Complaint on November 27, 2009, which contained 216 pages and 713 numbered
paragraphs. (R. 1873; R. 1893; R. 2161; R. 2143.) The First Amended Complaint
prompted several more motions to dismiss from the defendants. (R. 2229; R. 2256; R.
2271; R. 2373.)
On January 22, 2010, the trial court "dismissefdj the fraud allegations arising
throughout the Amended Complaint since they [did] not contain the required level of
particularity" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (R. 2608-2607, attached as Ex. 1
in the Addendum hereto.) However, the Court granted Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud
within 20 days [of the January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with
particularity." (Id.)
Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on March 5, 2010, followed by
an 11-page Notice of Errata Regarding Second Amended Complaint on March 12, 2010.
(R. 3194, attached as Ex. B in Addendum to Appellants' Opening Brief on Appeal; R.
5048.) The Simpson Defendants (as defined in the List of All Parties to Proceedings in
District Court above) then filed a Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, asking
the trial court (1) to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud based claims for failure to plead with
particularity as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), (2) to dismiss the fraud based claims
related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville
Property (defined below) under Utah R. Civ. P. 19, (3) to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraudulent
nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch water purchase for failure to state a
claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and (4) to dismiss Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting
claims for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. 5267-5264.)
4
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Defendant Michael Aviano, Defendant Chad D. Carlson, and Defendant David Nemelka
also filed motions to dismiss on the basis that the allegations of fraud in the Second
Amended Complaint did not meet the particularity requirements under Rule 9(b). {See R.
5110; R. 5055; R. 5300.)
After hearing oral argument concerning the several motions to dismiss, the trial
court ruled from the bench on May 13, 2010, indicating it would dismiss the fraud based
claims for failure to plead with particularity and would dismiss the fraudulent
nondisclosure claim concerning the Double T Ranch water purchase, as well as Plaintiffs'
aiding and abetting claims, for failure to state a claim. (R o 1 \u 1K ? 1S 187:8, attached
as Ex. 6 in the Addendum hereto.) The court took the Rule 19 issues under advisement.
(R. 6136, 183:24-184:3.)
The trial court then issued two written rulings concerning the motions to dismiss.
The trial court's June 22, 2010 Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint reflected its ruling from the bench, dismissing Plaintiffs'
fraud based claims for failure to plead with particularity and dismissing the 1 )< >ubk' 1
Ranch water purchase, and the aiding and abetting claims, for failure to state a claim.
(R. 5606-5602, attached as Ex. 7 in the Addendum hereto.) In its June 16, 2010 Ruling
and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims in Second Amended
Complaint Under Rule 19, the trial court concluded that the estate of Ken Dolezsar was a
necessary and indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud based
claims related to Dolezsar. (R. 5595-5592, attached as Ex. 8 in the Addendum hereto.)
Plaintiffs then filed two separate petitions for discretionary appeal — one for each
5
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of the trial court's written orders. This Court granted Plaintiffs' petitions and
consolidated them into a single appeal in the above-captioned matter. (R. 5959.)
Statement of Facts
1.

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged 48 causes of action against

38 defendants. (R. 3194.)
2.

In Claim Nos. 1-10, Plaintiffs alleged claims related to the Hawaii

Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion,
unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act
against the following defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Michael Thompson;
Todd Dorny; Brandon Dente; Wood Springs, LLC; ALS Properties, LLC; Mai Ke Kula;
Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC; Ka Mahina, LLC; Dente, LLC; He Kaikolu, LLC; and
Koamalu Plantation (the "Hawaii Development Defendants"). (R. 3017-2978.)
3.

In the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs

alleged that Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's late ex-husband) communicated a number
of misrepresentations to Mower. Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar communicated these
misrepresentations to Mower, either "in ignorance of the falsity of the representations or
as part of a conspiracy with Michael Thompson, David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Todd
Dorny, Brandon Dente and their entities," after allegedly hearing such misrepresentations
from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson. (R. 3016, f 543.)
4.

Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the Hawaii Development

did Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or any other of the Hawaii
6
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Development Defendants made any representations directly to Mower. (R. 3017-3012,
Y! 538-559.)
5.

Dolezsar could not be joined to the case because he was killed on

November 15,2007. (R. 3056, «i 400.)
6.

Dolezsar's estate could not be joined because Plaintiffs waited to file this

case until October 2009, long after the expiration of the one year statute of limitations for
claims against Dolezsar's estate found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) (1992).
(R.5593.)
7.

In Claim Nos. 11-20, Plaintiffs alleged claims related to the Mapleton

Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion,
unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act
against the following defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Wood Springs, LLC;
Landmark Real Estate, Inc.; Oak Leaf, LLC; Sunny Ridge, LLC; KNDJ Development,
LLC; DN Simpson Holdings, LLC; SOS Mapleton Development, LLC; DN Simpson
Mapleton Holdings, LLC; The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC;
Pheasant Meadows, LLC; Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC;
Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC; David Nemelka; Chad Carlson; 2 Brothers
Communications; Allen Hakes; Lonestar Gutters, LLC; Dallas Hakes; Lonestar Builders,
LLC; Michael Marx; and Michael Aviano (the "Mapleton Development Defendants").
(R. 2978-2909.)

7
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8.

Similar to the fraud claims concerning the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs

alleged Dolezsar made a number of misrepresentations to Mower concerning the
Mapleton Development. Again, Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar communicated all of the
alleged misrepresentations directly to Mower, after allegedly hearing them from David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and that he did so "as part of a conspiracy with the
Simpsons." (R. 2975,1731; R. 2977, ^ 721; R. 2974,1734; R. 2973, f 739; R. 2970, |
757-758; R. 3048,1434; R. 2925,1977.)
9.

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made

any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (R. 2978-2962,ffl[717-814.)
10.

As part of the claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs

asserted claims on behalf of Magnet Bank, which claims Plaintiffs alleged were acquired
by Plaintiff Navona, LC in February 2008. (R. 2965,1793.)
11.

In the Magnet Bank fraud-based claims (Claim Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, and

20.), Plaintiffs alleged that the Mapleton Development Defendants made
misrepresentations and material omissions to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan
extended by Magnet Bank for the Mapleton Development. (R. 2969-2963,ffi[766 - 811.)
12.

In Claim Nos. 21-25, Plaintiffs alleged claims for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy
arising from Mower's purchase of approximately 30 acres of real property in Springville,
Utah (the "Springville Property"). Plaintiffs asserted these claims against David
Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Wood Springs, and Pheasant Meadows (the "Springville
Property Defendants"). (R. 2909-2896.)
8
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13.

As in the claims related to the Hawaii Development and the Mapleton

Development, Plaintiffs alleged that Dolezsar, "whether duped by or complicitous with
the Simpsons," communicated a number of alleged misrepresentations to Mower with
respect to the Springville Property. (R. 3048, ^ 434; R. 2908, H 1014.)
14.

Plaintiffs did not allege that any of the Springville Property Defendants

made any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (R. 3048, ^ 435; R. 2909-2905, ^
1007-1035.)
15.

In Claim Nos. 26-30, Plaintiffs alleged claims for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy
against David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, claiming the Simpsons made
misrepresentations to Mower through her "representatives" concerning the Mapleton
Development's share of costs for the construction of a water tank by Maple Mountain
Water Tank Development Company in connection with the Mapleton Development.
(R. 2896-2885.)
16.

In Claim Nos .31-32, Plaintiffs alleged claims for breach of fiduciary duty

and fraudulent nondisclosure against David Simpson, claiming Simpson failed to disclose
to Mower that he used funds from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares from a
company named Double T Ranch (the "Double T Water Purchase"). (R. 2885-2881.)
17.

Plaintiffs affirmatively alleged, and not in the alternative, that Ken

Dolezsar, David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others conspired and agreed to convert
Plaintiffs' property, make misrepresentations and material omissions to Plaintiffs, and
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breach their alleged fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. (R. 2926-2924,fflf975-980; R. 28972896,^1090.)
18.

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint spanned 361 pages and contained

48 causes of action and 1362 numbered paragraphs. (R. 3194.)
19.

Unfortunately, much of the length of the Second Amended Complaint

resulted from unnecessary detail, such as the 20 pages filled by Plaintiffs with minutia
from credit card statements to claim that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson allegedly
breached fiduciary duties to LD SQ by authorizing LD SQ to pay for personal expenses.
(R. 3149-3129,fflf179-198; see, e.g., R. 3172-3169,fflf93-105; R. 3162-3154,fflf131162; R. 3122-3121,ffif223-226; R. 3051-3050,fflf420-426.)
20.

Despite having included a host of unnecessary details, Plaintiffs' Fraud

Based Claims (as defined below) routinely omit essential details concerning the "who,
what, when, where and how" of the alleged fraud. (See, e.g., R. 2974, ^737 (who, when,
where); R. 2970,fflf757-758 (who, when, where); R. 3005-3004 (who, how); R. 30033002 (who, how); R. 2952-2948 (who, how); R. 2947-2945 (who, how); R. 2899-2898
(who, how); R. 2889-2888 (who, how); R. 2883-2881 (how); R. 3017, % 542 (who);
R. 2986,1679 (who), R. 2977, \ 720 (who); R. 2976, \ 726 (who); R. 2972, \ 143 (who);
R. 2908, If 1014 (who); R. 2895,f1094 (who); R. 2895, f 1096 (who); and R. 2895,
1f 1099 (who).)
21.

Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lumped

David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying Plaintiffs'
allegations of fraud. (See, e.g., R. 3017,1542; R. 2986,1679, R. 2977,1f 720; R. 2976,1f
10
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726; R. 2974, K 737; R. 2972, ^ 743; R. 2970 ^ 757-758; R. 2908, ^ 1014; R. 2895, ^
1094; R. 2895, ^ 1096; and R. 2895, ^ 1099; R. 3005,ffl[580-581; R. 2951-2949, ^ 833846; R. 2899-2898, K 1075; R. 2889, ^ 1134.)
22.

Although such allegations are made on "information and belief," Plaintiffs

consistently failed to plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David
Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or others made any of the alleged misrepresentations, or their
belief as to what David Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. (See,
e.g., R. 3113-3112,ffl[256-257; R. 3092-3086, Yl 314-317; R. 3048-3046,ffl|434-435; R.
3177-3174, ffl| 83-84.)
23.

Plaintiffs also made other information and belief allegations without the

necessary factual basis. For example, Plaintiffs alleged, "on information and belief," that
the 15 offers used in an appraisal of the Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet
Bank were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (R. 2966, ^ 787; R. 3098-3096,
•jffi 300-304.) However, Plaintiffs did not plead any facts demonstrating a basis for their
"information and belief that the offers were somehow "sham transactions." They simply
asserted the conclusion. (R. 2967-2966,ffl[784,787; R. 3079, ^ 340.)
24.

The Simpson Defendants addressed the several deficiencies in the Second

Amended Complaint in a motion to dismiss in which they asked the trial court (1) to
dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud based claims for failure to plead with the concise particularity
required under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), (2) to dismiss the fraud based claims related to the
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property under
Utah R. Civ. P. 19 for failure to join Dolezsar's estate, (3) to dismiss Plaintiffs'
11
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fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase for failure
to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and (4) to dismiss Plaintiffs' aiding and
abetting claims for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. 5267-5264,
attached as Ex. 3 in the Addendum hereto; R. 5288-5263, attached as Ex. 4 in the
Addendum hereto; R. 5430-5407, attached as Ex. 5 in the Addendum hereto.)
25.

The trial court granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling

from the bench and in two subsequent written rulings. (R. 6136, 182:15-187:14; R. 56065602; R. 5595-5592.)
26.

The court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud based claims — Claim Nos. 1, 4, 5,

11, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 29, and 32 in their entirety, and Claim Nos. 9, 10, 19, 20, 25, and
30 to the extent they were based on allegations of fraud (collectively, the "Fraud Based
Claims") — for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b). (R. 5603.)
27.

The court's Rule 9(b) decision adopted the reasoning in the Simpson

Defendants' memoranda. (R. 5605; R. 6136, 182:21-25; R. 5288-5265.) Additionally,
the court stated that Plaintiff Mower "was directly privy to what was said to her," yet
failed to include "where that should have occurred, when it would have occurred, what
words were used, who else was present, all those types of things that the Court indicated
in its prior rulings." The court also specifically noted that "there [were] circumstances
where there were not references to earlier facts that were pleaded, and [the Court] dofes]
not believe that counsel and the Court should have to guess where those facts are coming
from or go back and research where those facts are coming from." (R. 6136, 183:1-19.)
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28.

In its written ruling, the trial court determined that the "much too long and

involved" Second Amended Complaint "still [did] not provide the particularity mandated
by Rule 9(b)" and improperly "dump[ed] upon the [court]... the burden of sifting
through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs [had]
allege[d]... the facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." (R. 5605 (internal
quotations omitted).)
29.

As Plaintiffs had failed on successive attempts to properly plead their fraud

claims, the trial court granted dismissal under Rule 9(b) without leave to amend. (R.
5605, 5603; R. 6136,184:12-17,186:20-23.)
30.

The trial court also granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss

under Rule 19, dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii
Development (Claim Nos. 1,4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11,
14-16,19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Claim Nos. 21, 22, 24, and 25).
(R. 5595-5592; R. 5265.)
31.

Relying on the case of Turville v. J & J Properties, Inc., 2006 UT App 305,

145 P.3d 1146, and its remarkably similar fact pattern, the court determined that
Dolezsar's estate was both a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19.
Specifically, based on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, the trial court
concluded that Dolezsar "occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud"
because all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii Development, the
Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower directly by
Dolezsar. The court therefore determined that "Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go13
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between" as argued by Plaintiffs, and that "complete relief would not be available for
those who [were] already parties" in his absence. The trial court further determined that
"an adequate resolution to [Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the
absence of Mr. Dolezsar's estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to
Simpsons is to dismiss the claims for fraud." (R. 5595-5592.)
32.

The trial court also dismissed the Double T Ranch Water Purchase

fraudulent nondisclosure claim (Claim No. 32) for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege that any of the allegedly non-disclosed facts
induced any action or influenced any decision by Plaintiffs. (R. 5605 n.l; R. 5603.)
33.

Finally, the court dismissed Plaintiffs aiding and abetting claims (Claim

Nos. 3, 5, 13, 15) for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Supreme
Court has not yet recognized civil causes of action for aiding and abetting. (R. 5604.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Dismissal Under Rule 9fb)
The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to
meet the "basic and fundamental.. . requirement of clarity and conciseness" imposed
under Rule 9(b). Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, f 23, 79 P.3d 974. Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint was 361 pages in length, contained 48 causes of action, and
had 1362 numbered paragraphs. Unfortunately, its length resulted from "unnecessary
detail, if not minutia," rather than the concise particularity required by Rule 9(b). By
intermingling unnecessary minutia and leaving out essential detail, Plaintiffs' 361-page
Complaint "[was] actually too replete with alleged facts, to such a degree that it [was]
14
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functionally incomprehensible," justifying dismissal under Rule 9(b). Coroles, 2003 UT
App 339,^127 n.12.
Additionally, throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently
lumped David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying
allegations of fraud. This did not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s standard, which requires a plaintiff
to set forth with specificity the time, place, content, and manner of each defendant's
alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs' practice of lumping defendants together in their
fraud allegations was compounded by the fact that they consistently did so based solely
on "information and belief." This is not surprising as Plaintiffs did not allege that David
Simpson or Nathan Simpson ever made any representations directly to Mower. Yet,
Plaintiffs failed to plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David Simpson
or Nathan Simpson made any of the alleged misrepresentations to Dolezsar (who
allegedly made the misrepresentations to Mower), or their belief as to what David
Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
information and belief allegations had no value under Rule 9(b).
The trial court therefore found that Plaintiffs' failure to specifically plead what
Mower knew and how she knew it justified dismissal of Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims
for failure to plead with particularity. In so doing, the trial court did not "ignore[]
established agency principles," as argued by Plaintiffs. Rather, the court required Mower
to allege what she knew and how she knew it to support her "information and belief
allegations that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others made any
misrepresentations or omissions at all.
15
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For these and the other reasons outlined below, the trial court correctly dismissed
Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to meet the pleading standard of Rule 9(b).
Dismissal Under Rule 19
As demonstrated by the case of Turville v. J&JProps., L. C, 2006 UT App 305,
1fl[ 36-37, 145 P.3d 1146, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding under
Rule 19 that the estate of Ken Dolezsar was a necessary and indispensable party to this
case. Based on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, the trial court determined that
Dolezsar, like the absent party in Turville, "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the
alleged fraud because all of the alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower directly
by Dolezsar. Plaintiffs cannot dispute that all of the misrepresentations were made to
Mower by Dolezsar because that is what they affirmatively alleged in their Complaint.
That Plaintiffs alleged Dolezsar was Mower's agent does not make him any less
indispensable. Dolezsar was indispensable not because he was an agent, a joint tortfeasor,
or even a co-conspirator, but because he "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the
alleged fraud similar to the absent party in Turville. As has been recognized by this
Court, situations like those in Turville and in this case are not governed by the general
rule that joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties. If anything, Dolezsar5s having made
the misrepresentations to Mower while acting as her agent only strengthens the
conclusion that Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud. The
trial court therefore acted within its discretion when it concluded that Dolezsar was
necessary to the just adjudication of this case because "complete relief would not be
available for those who [were] already parties" in his absence.
16
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The trial court also acted within its discretion in concluding that Dolezsar was an
indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims related to the
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property.1
Applying the factors outlined in Rule 19(b), the trial court determined that "an adequate
resolution to [Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the absence of
Mr. Dolezsar's estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is
to dismiss the claims for fraud." This unavoidable prejudice included, among other
things, the fact that the Simpson Defendants might be subjected to joint and several
liability for misrepresentations allegedly communicated by Dolezsar without the ability to
hold Dolezsar accountable through cross-claim, cross-examination, or otherwise as a
result of Plaintiffs' failure to file their fraud claims within the applicable limitations
period. Further, because Dolezsar's estate can still bring claims against the Simpson
Defendants, allowing the fraud claims to go forward in this case would potentially subject
the Simpson Defendants to multiple or inconsistent obligations. The trial court's Rule
19(b) determination was thus fully supported and within its discretion.
Dismissal Without Leave to Amend
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to amend
after Plaintiffs had failed to properly plead their fraud despite at least three prior attempts
and express direction from the court. Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to file a properly
1

The trial court did not dismiss all of the fraud based claims under Rule 19 as asserted by
Plaintiffs. It simply granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss, which sought
dismissal under Rule 19 of all fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development,
the Mapleton Development (other than those associated with Magnet Bank), and the
Springville Property. (R. 5592, 5265; R. 5768-5763.)
17
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supported written motion for leave to amend to the trial court, which of itself justifies the
court's refusal to grant leave to amend.
Dismissal of Aiding and Abetting Claims
The Court should decline to create a new cause of action for aiding and abetting in
this case, where Plaintiffs have alleged claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. To the extent Plaintiffs wish to extend liability to
persons with whom they had no dealings, they should be required to prove their claims
for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' FRAUDBASED CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO PLEAD WITH PARTICULARITY.
"Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that fraud claims be pled

with particularity." DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). Under Rule 9(b), a
plaintiff must "allege with particularity facts necessary to make all their elements of
fraud." Id.; see also Otsuka Elecs. (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d
1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("[AJppellants must state with particularity the
circumstances supporting each element of fraud."). "At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires
that a plaintiff set forth the who, what, when, where and how of the alleged fraud, and
must set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the
party making the false statements and the consequences thereof." United States ex rel
Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, All F.3d 702, 726-27 (10th Cir.
2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements apply not only to "allegations of commonlaw fraud," but extend to "all circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of
misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its
broadest dimension." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982).
Thus, Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements apply to all of Plaintiffs' Fraud-Based Claims.
Ignoring the fact pleading requirement of Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs incorrectly ask the
Court to apply the standard governing motions under Rule 12(b) to determine whether the
trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud-Based Claims for failure to plead with
particularity. (Appellants' Opening Br. 25.) "[Rule 12(b)(6)], however, does not apply
to actions for fraud." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443. Accordingly, the Court need not "draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," as proposed by
Plaintiffs. (Appellants'Opening Br. 25.)
In this case, Plaintiffs' 361-page Complaint failed to clearly and concisely provide
the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Accordingly, as outlined below, the trial court
properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims.
A.

The Second Amended Complaint Did Not Comply With Rule 9(b)'s
Fundamental Requirement of Clarity and Conciseness.

Under the notice pleading requirements espoused by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, plaintiffs are required to set forth their claims for relief in "a short and plain
statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Where
fraud is at issue, "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Together, the purpose of these pleading Rules is "to
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require that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth with simplicity,
brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be determined whether there exists a legal basis
for the relief claimed." Heathman v. Hatch, 372 R2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962).
A trial court may properly dismiss a complaint that does not satisfy the "basic and
fundamental... requirement of clarity and conciseness" imposed under Rule 9(b).
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, If 23, 79 P.3d 974. For example, in the case of
Coroles v. Sabey, the plaintiffs filed a complaint containing 13 different causes of action,
consisting of'125 paragraphs spanning 136 pages, the first 646 paragraphs and 125
pages of which [werej alleged facts." Id. at ^ 6. However, the length of the complaint
was the result of "unnecessary detail, if not minutia," instead of the concise
"particularity" required by Rule 9(b). Id. at 123 n.l 1. Indeed, the complaint "[was]
actually too replete with alleged facts, to such a degree that it [was] functionally
incomprehensible," leaving the Court "unable to ascertain what facts are claimed to
constituted [the fraud] charges." Id. at ^f 27 n.l2 (internal quotations omitted).

This

problem was compounded by the fact that the plaintiffs merely incorporated the facts
stated in the 660 paragraphs preceding their fraud claim, rather than setting forth the
specific facts constituting the alleged fraud within the actual cause of action. Id. f 25.
In so doing, the Coroles plaintiffs "essentially dumpfed] upon the trial court...

2

See also Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, No. 94-4196, 69 F.3d 547, 1995 WL 645678,
at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1995) ("As this case exemplifies, mere wordiness is not what it
takes to state a cause of action under Rule 9. It is a matter of precision, not length that
is required."). The Arena Land & Investment case was favorably cited by this Court in
Coroles. Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, at f27.
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the burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain
whether Plaintiffs ha[d] allege[d]... facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."
Id. at ^ 27 (internal quotations omitted). The Court held that the plaintiffs' "much too
long and involved complaint" thus failed to set forth "with simplicity, brevity, clarity and
certainty" the relevant surrounding facts "in such a manner that it [was] evident what
facts [were] claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Id. at *| 27 (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted).3 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs' fraud claims for failure to plead with particularity under Rule 9(b). Id. at
^ 30; see also Glenn v. First Natl Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368, 371-72 (10th
Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of complaint after concluding "the trial court did not err
in refusing to attempt to create order out of chaos"); Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty, No.
94-4196, 69 F.3d 547,1995 WL 645678, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 3,1995) (affirming
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9(b) after concluding "[i]t is neither the court's nor the
appellees' role to sift through a lengthy, conclusory and poorly written complaint to piece
together the cause of action.")
As with the complaint in Coroles, the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s fundamental requirement of clarity and conciseness. The
Second Amended Complaint spans 361 pages in length, containing 1362 numbered
paragraphs. Unfortunately, much of the length of the Complaint results from
3

The Coroles Court also noted that the plaintiffs' had failed "to identify exactly who
made the alleged misrepresentations" by asserting allegations in the passive voice.
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, at ^ 28. As set forth in Part LB below, Plaintiffs likewise
failed to identify exactly who made the alleged misrepresentations by improperly
grouping defendants throughout their Second Amended Complaint.
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"unnecessary detail, if not minutia," rather than the concise particularity required by Rule
9(b). See Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, If 23 n. 11. For example, Plaintiffs filled 20 pages
of the Complaint with unnecessary detail from credit card statements to claim that David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson allegedly breached fiduciary duties to LD SQ by
authorizing LD SQ to pay for personal expenses. (R. 3149-3129,fflf179-198; see also R.
3172-3169, fl 93-105; R. 3162-3154,fflf131-162; R. 3122-3121, ^ 223-226; R. 30513050,ffljf420-426.) As a result of including unhelpful minutia, the Complaint "rambles
on for [177] pages before reaching the first claim for relief." Arena Land & Inv. Co.,
1995 WL 645678, *1.
Similar to the complaint in Coroles, the Second Amended Complaint incorporates
by reference all of the 536 paragraphs from the general factual statement into each of the
fraud-based claims. (R. 3017,173; 3005,1579; R. 3003,1588; R. 2994, f 631; R.
2987, | 670; R. 2978,1717; R. 2952,f831; R. 2947,1855; R. 2926,1971; R. 2923,1
984; R. 2909,11007; R. 2899,11074; R. 2898,11081; R. 2896, ^ 1093; R. 2889,1
1133; R. 2888,11139; R. 2882, f 1175.) As Plaintiffs point out, the Fraud Based Claims
contain a number of references to specific allegations within the 536-paragraph general
factual statement. However, many of the allegations within those claims do not contain
the "who, what, when, where and how" of the alleged fraud and do not reference any
other allegations in the general section that might supply the missing information. For
example, as part of the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs
made the following allegation:
737. David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and Ken Dolezsar also
22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

represented to [Mower] that the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used
to fund development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development
project, that she would receive a first position deed of trust securing a
promissory note and that they would record the deed of trust in the office of
the Utah County Recorder.
(R. 2974, \ 737.) Plaintiffs did not specify who in particular made the alleged
representations or when or where they were made. When Defendants pointed out this
deficiency to the trial court, Plaintiffs claimed that paragraph 737 somehow "refer[ed] to
the allegations contained in paragraph 736." (R. 5375.) However, neither paragraph 736
nor paragraph 315 (to which paragraph 736 refers) provided the missing information.
Similarly, each of Plaintiffs' fraudulent non-disclosure claims failed to include
allegations explaining how the alleged omissions resulted in damages to Plaintiffs (i.e.,
why they were material or how Plaintiffs relied on them).4 For example, in the fraudulent
nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase, Plaintiffs alleged that
David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he had used money from LD
III to purchase water shares in the name of Wood Springs, as well as other alleged
happenings after the alleged purchase. (R. 2882, ^ 1176-1179.) However, Plaintiffs did
4

"A party is liable for fraudulent nondisclosure if he c omi[ts]... a material fact when
there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other
party, with actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party" Barber Bros.
Ford, Inc. v. Foianini, 2008 UT App 463, *| 2 (emphasis added) (unpublished decision).
"Under Rule 9(b), a complaint must identify the time, place, and content of each
allegedly fraudulent representation or omission, identify the person responsible for it,
and identify the consequences thereof" Caprin v. Simon Transp. Servs., Inc., 99 Fed.
Appx. 150,158 (10th Cir. Feb. 23, 2004) (emphasis added) (unpublished decision). See
also Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Sterling Cook Brown Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d
282,293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[W]here the alleged fraud consists of an omission . . . the
complaint must still allege . . . the context of the omissions and the manner in which
they mislead the plaintiff.").
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not allege that these nondisclosures induced any action or influenced any decision by
Mower. Instead, they simply alleged that David Simpson's failure to disclose somehow
damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of $300,125.00. (R. 2882, f 1182.) In their
brief to this Court, Plaintiffs argue that the necessary detail concerning their reliance on
the alleged omissions in their five claims for fraudulent nondisclosure was found in
paragraphs 85, 258, 318, 359, 436, and 487. Yet, none of these allegations was
referenced within any of the nondisclosure causes of action. (R. 3005-3004; R. 30033002; R. 2952-2948; R. 2947-2945; R. 2899-2898; R. 2889-2888; R. 2883-2881.) They
were simply buried in the 536 paragraphs of general facts. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not
direct the trial court's attention to any of these paragraphs in opposing the Simpson
Plaintiffs'motion to dismiss.
As demonstrated by these and other examples,5 Plaintiffs improperly placed the
burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts on the trial court to
determine whether Plaintiffs had supplied the missing information. Plaintiffs make clear
that this is precisely what they intended by urging this Court to reverse the trial court for
not "considering] the Second Amended Complaint as a whole." (Appellants' Opening
Br. 30.) Plaintiffs also complain that the Simpson Defendants used examples in its
memoranda to the trial court rather than pointing out every single deficiency in Plaintiffs

5

(See R. 2970, Iflf 757-58 (failing to set forth who among David Simpson, Nathan
Simpson, and Dolezsar made the alleged representations or when or where they were
made).)
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Fraud Based Claims.6 However, "[i]t is [Plaintiffs'] responsibility, not the courts', to set
forth the relevant surrounding facts in such a manner that it is evident what facts are
claimed to constitute [the fraud] charges." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, \ 27 (internal
quotations omitted). In their memorandum to the trial court, Plaintiffs merely addressed
the examples of pleading deficiencies highlighted by the Simpson Defendants, making no
attempt to point the trial court to other allegations that Plaintiffs apparently believed were
pleaded with particularity. That the trial court refused "to do Appellants' work for them"
in this regard is not grounds for reversal. Glenn, 868 F .2d at 371.
In short, by intermingling unnecessary minutia and leaving out essential detail,
Plaintiffs' 361-page Second Amended Complaint "is actually too replete with alleged
facts, to such a degree that it is functionally incomprehensible." Coroles, 2003 UT App
339, ^| 27 n.12. As a result, the Complaint failed to provide "a clearly defined foundation
upon which further proceedings by way of responsive pleadings and/or trial [could] go
forward in an orderly manner." Id. at ^ 23. The trial court was therefore justified in
dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims for failure to plead with the concise particularity
required by Rule 9(b).
B.

Plaintiffs Improperly Lumped David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and
Others Together in Levying Unsupported "Information and Belief
Fraud Allegations Throughout the Second Amended Complaint.

The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) "[are] especially important in cases
involving multiple defendants." Cook v. Zions First NaVl Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424
6

The Simpson Defendants' opening and reply memoranda to the trial court were 24
pages and 22 pages, respectively, and surely would have been longer had they attempted
to point out every deficiency in the Second Amended Complaint.
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(D. Utah 1986). "[EJach defendant is entitled to know precisely what it is the plaintiff
claims he did wrong.59 Id. Lumping multiple defendants together into allegations of
fraud does not meet this requirement and constitutes grounds for dismissal. See id. at
424-25 (dismissing with prejudice fraud claims where plaintiffs failed on third attempt to
"allege specifically the factual basis upon which they charge each defendantwith fraud."
(emphasis added)); Coroles, 2003 UT App 339,128 n. 15 (citing Cook for the proposition
plaintiffs must "set forth in specific terms the time, place, content, and manner of each
defendant's alleged misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct.") (emphasis
added); Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, 891 F. Supp 1469, 1477 (D. Col. 1995) ("When
plaintiff is dealing with more than one defendant, he or she is under a Rule 9(b)
obligation to specify which defendant told which lie and under what circumstances.").
Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lumped David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and often others, together in levying Plaintiffs' allegations
of fraud. (See, e.g., R. 3017,1542; R. 2986,1679, R. 2977, f 720; R. 2976, f 726; R.
2974,1737; R. 2972,1743; R. 2970 ^ 757-58; R. 2908,11014; R. 2895, f 1094; R.
2895,11096; andR. 2895,11099; R. 3005, U| 580-581; R. 2951-2949, ffl 833-846; R.
2899-2898,11075; R. 2889,11134.) Paragraph 542 of the Complaint exemplifies this
improper practice:
542. Michael Thompson, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson,
knowing that Ken Dolezsar was acting as [Mower's] agent, that Dolezsar
was managing Leslie's business affairs and that he was [Mower's] husband,
made the representations to Dolezsar described in paragraphs [sic] 83
herein.
(R. 3016, ^ 542.) Here, Plaintiffs merely lumped Michael Thompson, David Simpson,
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and Nathan Simpson together without specifying which of the three made the alleged
misrepresentations. Plaintiffs then went on to attribute these statements to Dolezsar,
claiming he was "part of a conspiracy" with Michael Thompson, David Simpson, Nathan
Simpson, and others. (R. 3016, ^ 543.) Plaintiff similarly lumps David Simpson, Nathan
Simpson, and Dolezsar together throughout the Second Amended Complaint. {See, e.g.,
R. 2974,TCI737, 758.)
Plaintiffs' practice of lumping defendants together in their fraud allegations is
magnified because they consistently do so solely on "information and belief." {See, e.g.,
R. 3113-3112, \\ 256-257; R. 3092-3086, \\ 314-317; R. 3048-3046, ^ 434-435; R.
3177-3174, Yf 83-84.) Fraud allegations made on information and belief are sufficient
for Rule 9(b) purposes only if the plaintiffs "include[] the facts upon which the belief is
based." Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, «fl 8 (citing Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT
App 86, *| 24, 69 P.3d 286) (unpublished decision); see also 2 Moore's Federal Practice
§ 9.03[l][g] (3d ed. 2010) ("Pleadings alleging fraud usually may not be based on
information and belief.").
Plaintiffs did not plead any factual basis to support their information and belief
allegations. For example, in paragraph 316 Plaintiffs alleged, "[o]n information and
belief," that "David Simpson and Nathan Simpson . . . made . . . promises,
representations and offers of contractual consideration to Ken Dolezsar and caused
Dolezsar to repeat the promises, representations and offers of contractual consideration to
[Mower] in behalf of the Simpsons." (R. 3090,^316.) As neither David Simpson nor
Nathan Simpson is alleged to have ever made any representations directly to Mower,
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Plaintiffs had to plead this allegation on information and belief. Yet, Plaintiffs failed to
plead any facts to explain the basis for their belief that David Simpson or Nathan
Simpson made any of the alleged representations, or their belief as to what David
Simpson or Nathan Simpson said or did not say to Dolezsar. (R. 3092-3086,fflf314318.) Thus, Plaintiffs' information and belief allegations are of no value under Rule 9(b).
Plaintiffs' failure to specifically plead what Mower knew and how she knew it was
specifically cited by the trial court as justification for its conclusion that the Fraud Based
Claims had not been properly pleaded with particularity. (R. 6136, at 183:1-10, 186:813;R.5594. 7 )
Plaintiffs' consistent lumping of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others in
their unsupported "information and belief fraud allegations violated the pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b) and therefore fully supported the trial court's dismissal of the
Fraud Based Claims. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25.
C.

Plaintiffs Pleaded the Magnet Bank Fraud Claims Using Labels and
Conclusions Rather Than Properly Pleaded Facts.

Mere pleading of labels and conclusions, such as "false statements" or "fraud,"
does not satisfy Rule 9(b)'s fact pleading requirements. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

U.S.

, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of "labels and conclusions" that "do not permit the
As stated by the trial court: "[TJhere is no factual basis in the complaint for what, if
anything, Simpsons actually told Mr. Dolezsar and no way of determining the accuracy
of any information Mr. Dolezsar may have passed to Ms. Mower from Simpsons. This
is one of the problems with the fraud allegation in the Complaint. What Mr. Dolezsar
specifically told Ms. Mower and how and where he said it is presumably known only to
her, but none of her complaints identify it with particularity." (R. 5594.)
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court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct").
Plaintiffs pleaded their Magnet Bank fraud claims by using labels and conclusions
rather than properly pleaded facts. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that David Simpson
and Nathan Simpson somehow duped an appraiser into using allegedly fraudulent "presales" — which the appraisal itself clarifies were offers — to arrive at the valuation of the
Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan application.
(R. 2966, H 787; R. 5373.) However, Plaintiffs failed to include any factual basis for their
claim that the offers were "sham transactions." (R. 2967-2966,ffl[784,787; R. 3079, ^
340.) Rather, Plaintiffs merely alleged, "on information and belief," that each of the
approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (R. 3098-3096,
^ 300-04.) Plaintiffs did not plead any facts in their 361-page Complaint demonstrating
a basis for their "information and belief that the offers were somehow "sham
transactions." They simply asserted the conclusion, which has no Rule 9(b) value.
Similarly, Plaintiffs alleged in conclusory fashion that the Simpsons submitted
false financial statements to Magnet Bank in connection with the application. (R. 29692967, Y(| 766-777.) Without making any attempt to explain how, Plaintiffs merely
conclude that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson's financial statements overstated their
assets and understated their liabilities. (R. 3074-3073,ffl|352, 353, 355; R. 2968, ^ 771773.) Rule 9(b) requires that this detail be pleaded "so that there will be a clearly defined
foundation upon which further proceedings . . . can go forward in an orderly manner."
Heathman, 372 P.2d at 992. In their memorandum to the trial court, Plaintiffs argued that
the missing information was supplied in other paragraphs in the Complaint, specifically
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referencing paragraphs 323-326. (R. 5370-5369, attached as Ex. 2 in the Addendum
hereto.) However, these allegations are not referenced anywhere in the Magnet Bank
fraud claim. (R. 2969-2963,ffl[767-810.) This is yet another example where Plaintiffs
expected the Court to "siftf] through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain
whether Plaintiffs hafd] allegefd] . . . facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, | 2 7 . 8
Based on this pleading deficiency, as well as those outlined above, the trial court
correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' Fraud Based Claims for failure to plead with the clear and
concise particularity required by Rule 9(b).
n.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS RELATED TO KEN
DOLEZSAR UNDER RULE 19 FOR FAILURE TO JOIN AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of "necessary"

parties where feasible, and dismissal of the action in the absence of "indispensable"
parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)-(b); Turville v. J&JProps., L.C., 2006 UT App 305,fflf3637, 145 P.3d 1146. Analysis under Rule 19 proceeds in two steps: First, the trial court
must determine whether an absent party is necessary to the "just adjudication" of the
action. Second, where an absent party is found to be necessary to the action, but cannot
feasibly be joined, the court must determine whether such party is indispensable such that
the action must be dismissed in his absence. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, at Yl 36-37.
8

The Simpson Defendants expressly incorporate the arguments of Appellee Michael
Aviano concerning the remaining portion of the Magnet Bank fraud claim, in which
Plaintiffs alleged that Aviano, David Simpson, and Nathan Simpson misrepresented the
sales price for Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 in the Mapleton Development.
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"[A] trial court's determination properly entered under Rule 19 will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, \ 40,29 P.3d 638 ("A trial
court's determination of whether a party should be joined to an action will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); Turville, 2006 UT App 305, ^ 24 ("We will
not disturb [a] trial court's determination [that] a party should be joined to an action . . .
absent an abuse of discretion.") (internal quotations omitted).
In its thorough Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims
in Second Amended Complaint Under Rule 19, the trial court in this case determined that
Dolezsar's estate was a necessary and indispensable party and carefully "identified] the
specific facts and reasoning that supported] its conclusion." Turville, 2006 UT App 305,
^ 38. The court therefore granted the Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs'
fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and
the SpringviUe Property. As set forth below, the Court acted well within its discretion in
so doing.
A.

The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Determining Dolezsar
Was Necessary to the Just Adjudication of This Action,

Under Rule 19(a), a party may be necessary in either of two ways:
"(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest."
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Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Here, the trial court concluded that Dolezsar was a necessary party
under Rule 19(a)(1) based on facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs.9 (R. 5595-5591.)
Specifically, the court determined that Dolezsar "occupied a pivotal representative role in
the alleged fraud" and therefore that "complete relief would not be available" in his
absence, relying on the remarkably similar case of Turville v. J&JProperties, L.C., 2006
UTApp 305, 145 P.3d 1146. (R. 5593.)
As demonstrated by the Turville opinion, the trial court's determination in this
regard was within its discretion. In Turville, this Court upheld the lower court's
determination that complete relief was not possible for purposes of Rule 19(a) in the
absence of a party who was the primary participant in the fraud alleged by the plaintiff.
Turville, 2006 UT App 305,140. The plaintiff (Turville) sued Tri-J Properties LLC and
its principals (Clark, Quitiquit, and Ritchie) in relation to two real estate transactions. Id.
at 1Hf 2-8. Turville primarily dealt with Clark, who agreed to sell two parcels of property
owned by Tri-J in exchange for a $1,000,000 note and assumption of the debts associated
with the properties. Id. at ^ 3-6. Unfortunately, Clark entered this agreement without
the knowledge or consent of Quitiquit and Ritchie, who thereafter refused to allow Tri-J
to turn over its property interest. Id. As a result, Turville asserted claims for (among

9

As outlined in Parts II.B.l and II.B.3 below, Dolezsar was also a necessary party under
Rule 19(a)(2) because in his absence, the Simpson Defendants would be subject to a
substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations.
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others) fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy against Ritchie, Quitiquit, Clark,
Tri-J, and other related persons and entities. Id. at ^ 8. Turville initially served only
Ritchie and then waited more than two years to serve the other defendants. Id. at ^ 9. In
the interim, Clark died of cancer and was never served. Id. at \ 10. Clark sought leave to
amend to join Clark's estate as a party to the case, but leave was denied as untimely and
unjustified. Id. at <|| 32.
Ritchie and Quitiquit then moved the court to dismiss Turville's complaint for
failure to join Clark's estate as a necessary and indispensable party. Id. at ^ 10,17.
Recognizing Clark's "pivotal representative role . . . in the transactions at issue," and that
the other parties faced a "substantial risk of incurring multiple obligations without
recourse to [Clark's] estate," the trial court found that Clark's estate was a necessary
party to the case. Id. at ^ 9. This Court affirmed, holding "the record supported] the trial
court's conclusion that 'in [the Estate of Mr. Clark's] absence[,] complete relief cannot
be accorded among those already parties.'" Id. at ^| 40 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)).

Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the Turville Court concluded Clark was a necessary
party solely because he was named as a defendant in the case. Careful reading of the
Turville opinion shows that Clark's having been named as a defendant was simply strong
evidence that he was "primarily" responsible for the conduct that allegedly damaged the
plaintiff—which was the justification for finding he was a necessary party. Turville,
2006 UT App 305, \ 40. Whether a person is a necessary party under Rule 19(a) cannot
turn merely on whether the plaintiff names such person as a defendant. Otherwise,
plaintiffs could control the outcome of Rule 19 analysis merely by declining to name an
otherwise necessary party as a defendant. Moreover, as they allege that Dolezsar made
all of the representations of which they complain as part of a conspiracy to defraud them,
Plaintiffs surely would have named Dolezsar as a defendant had they filed this case
before he died or during the limitations period for joining his estate under Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-803(a). That Clark happened to die after the Turville complaint was filed
does not make him any more necessary under Rule 19(a) than Dolezsar.
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Specifically, because Clark's actions "primarily, if not solely,... led to Plaintiffs
alleged damages," the Court held that "the interest of fairness to the parties in [the]
litigation" justified the trial court's determination that Clark's estate was a necessary
party to Turville's case. Id.
As did the lower court in Turville, the trial court in this case acted within its
discretion when it concluded that Dolezsar was a necessary party to Plaintiffs' fraudbased claims. Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiffs, the trial court concluded that
Dolezsar, like Clark, "occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud. (R.
5593.) Comparing Dolezsar to Clark, the Court noted Plaintiffs affirmatively pleaded
that all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii Development, the
Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower directly by
Dolezsar. (R. 5594.) "[Plaintiffs] [did] not cite an instance where [the] Simpsons
directly made a misrepresentation to her." (R. 5594.) The Court therefore concluded that
"Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go-between" as argued by Plaintiffs, and that
"complete relief would not be available for those who [were] already parties because of
the inability to hold him accountable" due to Plaintiffs' failure to join Dolezsar's estate
before the statute of limitations expired. (R. 5593.) In other words, "the interest of
fairness to the parties in [the] litigation" necessitated the joinder of Dolezsar's estate in
order for there to be a "just adjudication" of this matter. See Turville, 2006 UT App 305,
140. Additionally, like the defendants in Clark, the Simpson Defendants would face a
substantial risk of incurring multiple obligations without recourse to Dolezsar's estate, as
outlined in Parts ILB. 1 and II.B.3 below.
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The facts affirmatively alleged, and thereby admitted, by Plaintiffs in the Second
Amended Complaint fully supported the trial courts' determination that Dolezsar was a
necessary party.11 Plaintiffs alleged that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Dolezsar, and
others conspired and agreed to make misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (R. 2925, % 977.)
Importantly, however, Plaintiffs consistently alleged that Dolezsar was the one who
actually made the alleged misrepresentations to Mower. (R. 3016, <fl 543; R. 2977, \ 721;
R. 2975, H 731; R. 2974, ^ 734; R. 2973, ^ 739; R. 2970, K 757-58; R. 3048-3046, ^ 434435; R. 2908, ^ 1014.) Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the Hawaii
Development, the Mapleton Development, or the Springville Property did Plaintiffs
allege that any of the Simpson Defendants made any representations directly to Mower.
(R. 3017-3012,ffl|537-559; R. 2978-2962, Iffl 717-814; R. 3048-3046,1fl[ 434-35; R.
2909-2905, ffl| 1007-1035.) The Second Amended Complaint itself thus shows that
Dolezsar is alleged to be the nexus for the fraud alleged by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Dolezsar from Clark in the Turville case because
they alleged David Simpson and Nathan Simpson participated in the fraud by authorizing

Plaintiffs assert that the trial court made a factual determination in concluding that
Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role. This is incorrect. The trial court merely
relied on the facts affirmatively pleaded by Plaintiffs, thereby satisfying the requirement
that it "identify the specific facts and reasoning that supported] its conclusion that a
party is . . . necessary under Rule 19(a). Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik, 946 P.2d 744,
747 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). As outlined herein, Plaintiffs affirmatively alleged, and
cannot dispute, that Dolezsar communicated all of the alleged misrepresentations to
Plaintiffs. By contrast, in the Hancock case cited by Plaintiffs, the trial court's denial of
leave to amend was unsupported by the allegations in the complaint. Hancock v. The
True and Living Church of Jesus Christ of the Last Days, 2005 UT App 314, ^ 19,118
P.3d297.
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and instructing Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Plaintiffs.

(See, e.g.,

R. 3016,1543.) However, as the trial court recognized, Plaintiffs cannot, and did not,
dispute that all of the alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower by Dolezsar,
because that is what Plaintiffs alleged. (R. 5594.) Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that, like Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar "occupied
a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud." (R. 5593.)
That Plaintiffs alleged Dolezsar was Mower's agent does not change this result. It
is true that agents are typically not necessary parties to lawsuits against their principals
simply by virtue of their agency. See, e.g., Nottingham v. Gen. Am. Commc'ns Corp.,
811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding agent was not necessary party to claims against his
principal). However, the trial court did not conclude that Dolezsar was indispensable
because he was allegedly Mower's agent. Dolezsar was indispensable because he was
the one who allegedly communicated all of the alleged misrepresentations to Mower. If
anything, Dolezsar's having made the misrepresentations to Mower while acting as her
agent only strengthens the conclusion that Dolezsar occupied a pivotal representative role
in the alleged fraud. As the nexus for Plaintiffs' alleged fraud, Dolezsar's presence is
necessary to the "just adjudication" of Plaintiffs' fraud claims regardless of whether he
was acting as Mower's agent.

12

Notably, Plaintiffs did not allege any factual basis for what David Simpson, Nathan
Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar. Presumably, they rely on
hearsay statements from Dolezsar, which were not alleged.
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B.

The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Determining the Action
Could Not Proceed In Equity And Good Conscience in Dolezsar's
Absence.

Where a necessary party cannot be feasibly joined, and the action cannot proceed
"in equity and good conscience" in his absence, the party is deemed "indispensable," and
the action "should be dismissed." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) instructs the trial
court to consider the following factors in deciding whether "equity and good conscience"
require dismissal:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might
be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which,
by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule itself "does not state what weight is
to be given each factor," the trial court "must determine the importance of each factor on
the facts of each particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny v. Am.
Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974).
Applying these factors, the trial court determined that "an adequate resolution to
[Plaintiffs'] claims for fraud [could not] be reached in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar's
estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is to dismiss the
claims for fraud." (R. 5593-5592.) The court therefore concluded that Dolezsar's estate
was an indispensable party, necessitating dismissal of Plaintiffs' fraud claims related to
the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property. (Id.)
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1.

The Trial Court Properly Concluded That Rendering Judgment
In Dolezsar's Absence Would Result in Unfair Prejudice to
Defendants.

The Turville case again demonstrates that the trial court's indispensable party
determination was within its discretion. In Turville, the Court relied heavily on two facts
in upholding the lower court's determination that Clark was an indispensable party.
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, IHf 41-42. First, Clark was "the major, if not the sole, actor
responsible for Plaintiffs5 alleged damages." Id. at ^ 42. Second, the plaintiffs were
responsible for Clark's absence because they failed to join the estate within the
limitations period after Clark's death. Id. Under these circumstances, the court found
that it was unfair and prejudicial to require the other defendants to defend the case in
Clark's absence. Id. The Court therefore concluded that "the nonjoinder of the Estate of
Mr. Clark would violate principles of 'equity and good conscience.'" Id. at f 42.
The two factors on which the Turville Court relied are also present in this case.
First, the trial court concluded that, like Clark, "Mr. Dolezsar is more than a mere joint
tortfeasor and is one of the major actors in this case—potentially one who self-dealt and
defrauded others; all the allegedly fraudulent statements were made to Ms. Mower by
Mr. Dolezsar." (R. 5593.) As outlined in Part LA. above, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs
in the Second Amended Complaint fully support this conclusion. Second, as did Turville,
Plaintiffs failed to bring this action against Dolezsar's estate within the limitations period
found in Utah Code Ann. § 75~3-803(a) (1992) after Dolezsar's death. Under these
circumstances, which are indistinguishable from those at issue in Turville, the trial court
determined within its discretion that it would be unfair and prejudicial to require
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Defendants to defend against Plaintiffs' fraud claims in Dolezsar's absence. See Turville,
2006UTApp305,^(40.
Moreover, were Plaintiffs' fraud claims allowed to proceed without Dolezsar's
estate, the Simpson Defendants would be at risk of incurring, double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, at 110 (1968) ("[T]he defendant may properly wish to avoid
multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares
with another.") The one year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3803(a) (1992) applies to claims against the estate, but not to claims brought by the estate
on behalf of Dolezsar. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-108 (1975), the applicable
statutes of limitation on any claims held by Dolezsar at his death were automatically
tolled for a period of 12 months. Accordingly, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded by Utah
Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) from bringing claims against the Simpson Defendants related to
Plaintiffs' fraud claims. Consequently, Defendants are not only at risk of incurring
multiple or inconsistent obligations in subsequent litigation, but they would be precluded
from asserting their claims against the estate in any such proceeding. The trial court
acted within its discretion to prevent this unfair prejudice.
Finally, due to Dolezsar's untimely death, the parties in this case cannot question
him concerning the misrepresentations he allegedly communicated to Mower. Plaintiffs
attempted to impute Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the Simpsons by alleging
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson participated in the fraud by authorizing and
instructing Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., R. 3016, \
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543.) Plaintiffs did not allege any factual basis for what David Simpson, Nathan
Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar. Presumably, Plaintiffs would
claim that they rely on hearsay statements from Dolezsar. However, as a practical matter,
any statements by Dolezsar to Mower constitute inadmissible hearsay and cannot be
considered as evidence in this case. More important, Defendants will be denied the
opportunity to question Dolezsar concerning Plaintiffs' allegations in his absence. See
Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Autk, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3d Cir. 1998)
(recognizing possibility for prejudice resulting from inability to obtain evidence from
absent party).
2.

Plaintiffs Did Not Dispute That Prejudice to Defendants Could
Not Be Avoided By Any Protective Measures.

The trial court properly concluded that the prejudice which would result to
Defendants if Plaintiffs' fraud claims were allowed to proceed in Dolezsar's absence
"[could] be avoided [only] by dismissing the claims for fraud." (R. 5593-5592.)
Plaintiffs did not address the second factor listed in Rule 19(b) before the trial court, or in
their Opening Brief on Appeal, thereby conceding that the prejudice to Defendants could
not be avoided by other protective measures.
3.

The Trial Court Properly Determined That It Could Not Render
An Adequate Judgment in Dolezsar's Absence.

The third factor listed in Rule 19(b) — whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate — "referfs] to [the] public stake in settling disputes by
wholes, whenever possible." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 111. "Rule 19(b)'s
third factor is not intended to address the adequacy of the judgment from the plaintiffs
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point of view," as argued by Plaintiffs' to the trial court. See Davis v. United States, 343
F.3d 1282,1292-93 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that a judgment
would be adequate because it would afford the plaintiffs complete relief). "Rather, the
factor is intended to address the adequacy of the dispute's resolution." Id. at 1293.
Applying this standard, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding
"judgment rendered without Mr. Dolezsar would be inadequate because, among other
things mentioned by Simpsons, no cross claims can not be brought against his estate."
(R. 5593). As outlined in Part II.B.l above, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded under Utah
Code Ann. § 75-3-803 from bringing claims related to the alleged fraud against
Defendants in a different proceeding, thereby subjecting Defendants to risk of incurring
multiple or inconsistent obligations in Dolezsar's absence. Moreover, because Plaintiffs
did not timely join the estate to this proceeding, the trial court could not hear Defendants'
claims against Dolezsar relating to the alleged fraud. The trial court therefore correctly
concluded that any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's absence would be inadequate.
Plaintiffs argue that Dolezsar cannot be an indispensable party by citing the
general rule that Rule 19 typically does not require joinder of joint tortfeasors or coconspirators. (Appellants' Opening Br. 40.) However, Dolezsar was indispensable not
because he was a joint tortfeasor or co-conspirator. Rather, the trial court concluded that
Dolezsar was indispensable because he "occupied a pivotal representative role" in the
alleged fraud. (R. 5594-5593.) As recognized by this Court in Turville, situations like
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those of Clark and Dolezsar are not governed by the general rule.

See Turville, 2006

UT App 305,140; see also Freeman v. Nw. Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 559 (5th
Cir. 1985) (dismissing case where absent subsidiary company was "more than an active
participant in the [wrong] alleged by [the plaintiffs]; it was the primary participant.");
Hass v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach, 442 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1971)
(dismissing case under Rule 19(b) in absence of "active participant in the alleged
conversion of [plaintiff s] stock"); Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.M.B.H. v. Case Corp.,
201 F.R.D. 337, 340 (D. Del. 2001) (dismissing case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 where
"Plaintiffs' interactions were almost entirely with the [absent subsidiary companies] and
not with Defendant"). The trial court therefore acted within its discretion in applying the
Turville case and dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud claims for failure to join Dolezsar's estate
during the limitations period.
4.

The Trial Court Properly Concluded That the Unavoidable
Prejudice to Defendants Outweighed Plaintiffs' Interest in a
Forum For Their Fraud Claims.

The trial court "must determine the importance of each factor on the facts of each
particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny, 494 F.2d at 653. In this
case, the trial court properly determined based on the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Second
13

Plaintiffs also claim that Dolezsar is not indispensable because Defendants "can be held
liable for damages only in proportion to their own fault." (Appellants' Opening Br. 40.)
This is simply incorrect. Plaintiffs alleged that the fraud perpetrated on them was
carried out as part of a conspiracy. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that
claims for conspiracy, which impose joint and several liability, are not subject to
apportionment of fault under the Utah Liability Reform Act. Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005
UT 85, 128 P.3d 1146. The Jedrziewski court also held that whether other intentional
torts are subject to apportionment of fault is an open question. Jedrziewski, 2005 UT
85,124.
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Amended Complaint that the unavoidable prejudice to the Simpson Defendants
outweighed the fact that Plaintiffs might not have another forum for their fraud claims.
(R. 5593.) The court recognized that the Plaintiffs' remaining claims would not
"perfectly protect Ms. Mower's interests."14 (R. 5592.) However, recognizing the unfair
prejudice to the Simpson Defendants, the trial court concluded that "[i]n the absence of
Mr. Dolezsar and with the inability to join his estate as a party at this juncture,
[Plaintiffs'] remaining claims must suffice.") As demonstrated in Turville, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in assigning greater weight to the unfair and unavoidable
prejudice that would result to the Simpson Defendants in Dolezsar's absence. Turville,
2006 UT App 305, ^ 40-42 (upholding dismissal for failure to join indispensable party
despite absence of alternative forum for plaintiffs claims).
For all of these reasons, this Court should uphold the trial court's determination
that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton
Development, and the Springville Property could not continue in equity and good
conscience in the absence of Dolezsar and his estate.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS WITHOUT LEAVE
TO AMEND.
"This [C]ourt reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to amend for an abuse of

discretion, reversing only when the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability."

14

Any possible deficiency in this regard resultedfromPlaintiffs' failure to bring the
fraud-based claims within the limitations period. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to
wait until after the central figure in the case can no longer be joined to seek recovery
from others who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him.
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Turville, 2006 UT App 305,123 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Exercising
its broad discretion, the trial court may consider any factor it deems relevant to the case
before it in ruling on a motion to amend, including without limitation timeliness,
motivation, and prejudice. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44,fflf3941, 87 P.3d 734. Among other reasons, the court may deny leave to amend where there
have been "repeated failure[s] to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed."
Id 1f4l (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs failed to make a motion for leave to amend.
(Appellants' Opening Brief 43 ("Plaintiffs did not make a motion to amend the complaint
....").) For this reason alone, the Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal without
leave to amend. Holmes Dev.y LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,fflf56-59, 79 P.3d 974
(upholding denial of leave to amend where plaintiff failed to file a written motion for
leave to amend supported by a memorandum of points and authorities); Coroles, 2003
UT App 339,142-45 (same).
Regardless, the trial court acted within its discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs'
fraud-based claims "without leave to amend" after Plaintiffs had failed to properly plead
their fraud despite at least three attempts at doing so. (R. 5606-5602; R. 6136, at 186:2023 ("So there will not be leave to amend in this case, this would be going on our third well, as Mr. Carlile says we'd be down the road on this quite a ways.").) Each of the
three complaints filed by Plaintiffs was met with motions to dismiss. (R. 1873; R. 1893;
R. 2196; R. 2229; R. 2256; R. 2271; R. 2373; R. 5055; R. 5110; R. 5237; R. 5300.) The
trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint on January 22, 2010 for failure
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to plead with particularity, indicating it would give Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud
within 20 days [of the January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with
particularity." (R. 2608-2607.) Plaintiffs then filed their Second Amended Complaint,
and an 11-page Notice of Errata, which the trial court again dismissed for failure to plead
with particularity. (R. 3194; R. 5048.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend under these circumstances. See, e.g., Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 425
("Based on plaintiffs' continued failure to comply with Rule 9(b), the court believes that
plaintiffs' cause of action should be dismissed with prejudice.")
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE A NEW CIVIL
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "AIDING AND ABETTING" IN THIS CASE.
As recognized by Plaintiffs, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has

recognized a civil cause of action for aiding and abetting another person's commission of
a tort. See Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, ^ 34 n.19 (declining to decide whether claims for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable under Utah law.)
Creating a new cause of action for aiding and abetting is not necessary in this case.
Plaintiffs have alleged that the same group of defendants that "aided and abetted"
breaches of fiduciary duties and fraudulent nondisclosure also conspired to breach
fiduciary duties and engage in fraudulent nondisclosure, and were part of an "enterprise"
that allegedly did so in violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Act. (Claim Nos. 3,5,
9,10,13,15,19, 20.) To the extent Plaintiffs wish to broaden their net with respect to
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, they should be required to prove their
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claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, the
contours of which are clearly defined under Utah law.
Moreover, even were the Court to recognize a civil cause of action for aiding and
abetting, Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure are deficient
because Plaintiffs failed to properly allege the underlying fraud with particularity as
required by Rule 9(b). Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 36 ("[T]o sufficiently plead their
secondary fraud claims, Plaintiffs were obligated to adequately plead the existence of [the
underlying] tort.")
For these reasons, as well as those stated in the brief of Appellee Aviano, the
Court should uphold the trial courts dismissal of Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the trial
court in this matter.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2011.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

moat
Craig Carlile
Caleb J. Frischknecht
Attorneysfor the Simpson Defendants
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(R. 5288-5263.)
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Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint. (R. 5430-5407.)
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Transcript of May 13, 2010 Oral Arguments. (R. 6136, pp. 182-187.)
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Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. (R. 5606-5600.)

Ex. 8.

Ruling and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claims in Second
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LESLIE D. MOWER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

RULING GRANTING IN PART THE
VARIOUS DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
DISMISS

vs.
DAVID R. SIMPSON, et al.,

Civil No. 090403844
Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY

Defendants.
The Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint in light of common claims of
insufficiency made by the numerous defendants in this case. The claims which can be addressed
without the need for oral argument are those disputing the private rights of action pled under
different Utah criminal statutes and those claiming a failure to plead fraud with particularity. The
Court grants the Motions to Dismiss in part by dismissing Claims I, II, III, IV, V and VI of the
First Amended Complaint. The Court acknowledges plaintiffs now state they did not seek to set
forth causes of action under criminal statutes, but only meant to plead predicate facts for their
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Claim (UPUA). Since each violation of criminal statute is
identified as a "CLAIM," the Court assumes plaintiffs mispled and do not object to dismissing
those claims and moving the facts alleged in them to the UPUA claim..
The Court further dismisses the fraud allegations arising throughout the Amended
Complaint since they do not contain the required level of particularity-who in particular said or
represented what to whom in particular, when, where, and how such representations occurred,
the specific terminology used, why reliance was reasonable and what particular damages were
caused by each discrete action. Defendants are entitled to know the precise events on which
plaintiffs rely without having to infer what happened through assembling pieces of a puzzle
contained throughout a voluminous complaint. Plaintiffs are granted a chance to plead fraud
within 20 days hereof and do it concisely and with particularity.
All other facets of the motions, as well as plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motions for additional
time in which to conduct discovery, are reserved for resolution after oral argument. Counsel
wishing to participate should contact the clerk to set an oral argument. Defendants should
attempt to identify their common arguments to allow them to be addressed together. To the
extent any defendants have unique arguments, such as Mr. Nemelkas,' they can be heard after the
common arguments. Given the fact the file is going on 7 volumes, the Court would appreciate
courtesy copies five days before any hearing. Each party need present only its own pleadings as
courtesy copies.
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WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED:
Claims I through VI of the First Amended Compliant are dismissed but the facts alleged
therein and not already stated in Claim VII may be used to support the sufficiency of other
claims. The fraud allegations throughout the First Amended Complaint are dismissed with leave
to amend within 20 days hereof.
Dated this 22nd day of January 2010
•

77^

Samue[ DfMcVey/
District iCpiirt Judge
fe.'-^'. **"'
N & • <&> ^
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Bart J. Bailey (172)
William T. Jennings (8213)
BAILEY & JENNINGS, LC
584 South State Street
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 426-8600
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
D. MOWER, an individual; LD SQ, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; LD III, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; LD PURPOSE, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; and, NAVONA, LC,
a Utah limited liability company;
Plaintiffs;
LESLIE

vs.
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; NATHAN R.
SIMPSON, an individual; MICHAEL K.THOMPSON, an
individual; TODD DORNY, an individual; BRANDON
DENTE, an individual; DAVID N. NEMELKA, an
individual; DALLAS M. HAKES, an individual; CHAD
D. CARLSON, an individual; MICHAEL A. MARX, an
individual; ALLEN R. HAKES, an individual; MICHAEL
W. AVIANO, an individual; ALS PROPERTIES, LLC,
a Hawaii limited liability company; MAI KE KULA,
LLC, a Hawaii limited liability company; HANALEI
KAI HOLDINGS, LLC, a Hawaii limited liability
company; KA MAHINA, LLC, a Hawaii limited
liability company; H E KIAKOLU, LLC, a Hawaii
limited liability company; KOAMALU PLANTATION,
LLC, a Hawaii limited liability company; LANDMARK
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah corporation; WOOD
SPRINGS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
OAK LEAF, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
DENTE, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
SUNNY RIDGE, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company; KNDJ DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; DN SIMPSON HOLDINGS,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO THE SIMPSON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Oral Argument Requested)

Case No. 090403844

Judge: Samuel D. McVey

LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
[cont'd on Page 2]
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SOS MAPLETON DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; DN SIMPSON MAPLETON
HOLDINGS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
THE PRESERVE AT MAPLETON DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
PHEASANT MEADOWS, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company; CARNESECCA ORCHARD ESTATES, LLC,
a Utah limited liability company; SPANISH VISTA
PLAT I, LLC, a Utah limited liability company;
LANDMARK HOMES OF UTAH, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company; MAPLE MOUNTAIN WATER TANK,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; LONESTAR
GUTTERS, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 2
BROTHERS
COMMUNICATIONS,
a sole
proprietorship; LONESTAR BUILDERS, INC., a

fictitious entity; and, DOES 1-100;
Defendants;
and
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company; BANKOF AMERICAN FORK,
a Utah Corporation; and, KATHYA.TEMPLEMAN, an
individual;
Rule 19 Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this
Memorandum in Opposition to the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

3

Introduction

4

.. .

Discussion

5

I.

Pleading Fraud With Particularity

6

II.

MagnetBank Fraud

9

III.

Double T Water Purchase

16

IV.

Maple Mountain Water Project

17

V.

Failure to Join Estate of Ken Dolezsar

18

VI.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure

29

VII.

Aiding and Abetting Claims In Utah

30

Conclusion

31

Request for Oral Argument

32
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14; 70 P.3d 35
(Ut. Ct. App. 2003)
6
Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. v. Foianini, 2008 UT 463
29
Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990)
29
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App. 339
8, 30
Dale v. ALA Acquisitions, Inc., 203 F.Supp. 2d. 694 (S.D. Miss. 2002)
31
Dennis v. Wachovia Securities, 429 F.Supp. 2d. 281 (D. Mass. 2006)
27
Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 145 F.3d 635 (3rd Cir. 1998) 27, 28
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25; 44 P.3d 734 (Utah 2002)
19, 30
Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16; 28 P.3d 127 (Utah 204)
7
Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999)
24
Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 1101
(Ut. Ct. App. 1995)
29

Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 3

3, 4

Mallalieu-Golder Ins. Agency v. Executive Risk Indem., 254F.Supp 2d. 521
(M.D. Pa. 2003)
23, 24
Milligan v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1975)
27
Nottingham v. General American Communications Corp.,
811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975)
27
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,
390 U.S. 102 (1968)
26, 28
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §874
31
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
20
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989)
19, 21
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1992)
7
Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002)
. 20
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Reber, 203 P.3d 186 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004)
4
Turville v. J&J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App. 305;
145 P.3d 1146 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006)
21, 22, 23, 24, 25
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982)
7
Wipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996)
3
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47
30
INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. In a hearing
held in relation to David Nemelka's Motion to Dismiss, the Court ordered that any
Defendants who wanted to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
were required to file and serve such motion by April 13, 2010. On April 13, 2010,
Defendants David R. Simpson; Nathan R. Simpson; Todd Dorny; Koamalu Plantation, LLC;
Landmark Real Estate, Inc.; Wood Springs, LLC; Oak Leaf Investments, LLC; Dente, LLC;
Sunny Ridge, LLC; KNDJ Development, LLC; DN Simpson Holdings, LLC; SOS Mapleton
Development, LLC; DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC; The Preserve at Mapleton
Development Company, LLC; Pheasant Meadows, LLC; Carnesecca Orchard Estates,
LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC; Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC; Maple Mountain Water
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Tank, LLC and Kathy A. Templeman (collectively referred to as the "Simpson Defendants")
filed and served their Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint^
DISCUSSION
The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "to challenge the formal sufficiency of the
claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of the case." Wipple v.
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996)(emphasis added). "[A]
dismissal is justified only when the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that
the plaintiff does not have a claim." Id. (emphasis added). "A dismissal is a severe
measure and should be granted by the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim."
Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ut. Ct. App. 2000)(emphasis added).
The Court must consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Id. "The courts are a forum for settling

controversies and if there is any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the
lack of a factual basis, the issues should be resolved in favor of giving the party an
opportunity to present its proof." Id (emphasis added). "A motion to dismiss is properly
granted only in cases in which, even if the factual assertions in the complaint were correct,

1

Previously, Craig Carlile, represented the defendants submitting this Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint In addition, he previously represented Michael K. Thompson; Brandon Dente; ALS
Properties, LLC; Mai Ke Kula, LLC; Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC; Ka Mahina, LLC and He Kiakolu, LLC.
Plaintiffs can only assume that those parties are not part of the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint Further, the Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint lists Oak Leaf Investments, LLC as
being a party to the motion. However, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC was dismissed as a party to this action and
was previously represented by Jason Born, and has never been represented by Mr. Carlile.
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they provided no legal basis for recovery." Id. Stated another way, "a motion to dismiss is
appropriate only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled
to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support
their claim."

Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Reber, 203 P.3d 186, 188-89 (Ut. Ct. App.

2004)(emphasis added).
In summary, when considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all the
allegations contained in the complaint are true and it must also make all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Here, when the allegations of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint are taken as true and when all reasonable inferences are taken in Plaintiffs'
favor, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint must be
denied.
PLEADING FRAUD WITH PARTICULARITY

The Simpson Defendants request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs claims that are
based on fraud because Plaintiffs fail to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule
9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Simpson Defendants claim that they are left
to guess the substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. However, the Simpson
Defendants fail to read and comprehend the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint.
When alleging a cause of action for fraud, a party must set forth the facts with
"sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges." Armed
Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14 f l 6 ; 70 P.3d 35, 40 (Ut. Ct. App. 2003). In
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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addressing the adequacy of pleading fraud, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "our liberalized
rules of pleading are designed to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to the requirement
that their adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved." Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 161J14; 28 P.3d
1271, 1275 (Utah 2001).
Speaking of the requirement that fraud be plead with particularity, the United States
Circuit Court for the Third Circuit stated that "courts should be sensitive to the fact that
application of the Rule prior to discovery may permit sophisticated defrauders to
successfully conceal the details of their fraud." Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d
272, 284 (3rd Cir. 1992).

The Utah Supreme Court stated that to claim fraud with

particularity means that a party's allegations must contain the "substance of the acts
constituting the alleged wrong." Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah
1982). Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint adequately sets forth the alleged fraud with
the required particularity and gives the defendants fair notice of the substance of the alleged
wrongs.
While arguing generally that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint fails to contain
the required specificity, the Simpson Defendants point to only one paragraph they believe
does not meet the particularity requirement.

The Simpson Defendants argue that

paragraph 737 of the Second Amended Complaint does not specify who in particular made
the alleged representations or when they were made. The Simpson Defendants fail to
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carefully read the allegations. Paragraph 737 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
clearly states that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Ken Dolezsar made the
representations.

The allegations in paragraph 737 refer to the allegations contained in

paragraph 736. Those allegations clearly state that the misrepresentations were made at
the end of November or the beginning of December.
Further, the Simpson Defendants complain that Plaintiffs do not specifically set forth
who said exactly what. However, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, father and son,
would speak for each other. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges that David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson made the misrepresentations and therefore it satisfies the
pleading standard for fraud.
The Simpson Defendants further complain that they are left to guess the substance
of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. They point to paragraphs 721, 731,734 and 739
of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as examples of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the
specifics. However, an examination of those paragraphs shows otherwise.
Paragraph 721 alleges that Ken Dolezsar ("Dolezsar"), acting on David Simpson's
and Nathan Simpson's direction, repeated the misrepresentations contained in paragraphs
256 and 259 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint2 Plaintiffs' clearly describe when
the misrepresentations were made.

Paragraph 731 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended

Complaint states that the representations contained in paragraph 314 were made to Leslie

2

The Utah Court of Appeals specifically approved the practice of referencing preceding paragraphs
in a complaint. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 Ut App 339, fn13.
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D. Mower ("Leslie"). Paragraph 314 states the misrepresentations were made at the end
of November or the beginning of December. The allegations contained in paragraph 734
refer to the allegations in paragraph 315. Therefore, all of the necessary particularity is
present.
The misrepresentations referred to in paragraph 315 are clearly alleged to have been
made at the same time the misrepresentations referred to in paragraph 314 were made.
The allegations contained on paragraph 739 also refer to a previous paragraph, which
clearly indicates the misrepresentations were made at the same time as those contained
in paragraphs 314 and 315.

In an attempt to make their arguments, the Simpson

Defendants simply construe Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint in the most narrow
manner possible. However, the standard for a motion to dismiss is that the allegations must
be read broadly and all reasonable inferences must be taken in Plaintiffs favor. Further, the
Simpson Defendants focus on when their misrepresentations were relayed to Plaintiffs, not
when they made them, which is the issue in this matter. Plaintiffs clearly allege when David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson made the misrepresentations.
MAGNETBANK FRAUD

The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' have failed to explain what in
particular about the "offers" used in the appraisal relied on by MagnetBank makes them
fraudulent. The Simpson Defendants make a narrow reading of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended
Complaint, failing to refer to the relevant allegations and exhibits. Paragraphs 300 through
303 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint set forth the basic facts of the "offers" that
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were made for 14 lots located in The Preserve Development Project. The "offers" were
made between October 1, 2006 and October 6, 2006. In paragraph 335, Plaintiffs allege,
as part of the plan to deceive MagnetBank and its participating bank, that David Simpson
and Nathan Simpson caused MagnetBank to use the services of Free and Associates for
an appraisal. Plaintiffs clearly allege that the "offers" were used by the appraiser in arriving
at a value for The Preserve Development Project property.
The appraisal itself, dated January 3, 2007, is attached to Plaintiffs1 Second
Amended Complaint The parties who made offers on the 14 lots never actually purchased
the lots. However, the appraisal contains a section titled "History of the Project." It states,
"According to the purchase agreement provided by Mr. Nathan Simpson, the purchases are
as follows:
Transaction #3 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 40, 39, 38, and 37
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement
Date of Contract: October 1, 2006
Closing Date: Current Offer, to close when lots are finished
Buyer: Dallas Hakes
Purchase Price: $1,685,000.00
Price/Per Lot: Lot 40: $340,000.00
Lot 39: $340,000.00
Lot 38: $340,000.00
Lot 37: $340,000.00
Lot 33: $325,000.00
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a
good indicator for valuing the individual lots.
Transaction #4 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55.
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement
Date of Contract: October 2, 2006
Closing Date: Current Offer, to close when lots are finished
Buyer: Chad Carlson
Purchase Price: $1,650,000.00
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Price/Per Lot: Lot 51: $325,000.00
Lot 52: $325,000.00
Lot 53: $350,000.00
Lot 54: $325,000.00
Lot 55: $325,000.00
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a
good indicator for valuing the individual lots.
Transaction #5 - This is an offer on the subject lot numbers 49 and 50.
Information Source: Real Estate Purchase Agreement
Date of Contract: October 6, 2006
Closing Date: Current offer, to close when lots are finished
Buyer: Allen Hakes
Purchase Price: $650,000.00
Price/Per Lot: Lot 49: $325,000.00
Lot 50: $325,000.00
Relevancy to Current Value: This is an offer on the subject lots and therefore, is a
good indicator for valuing the individual lots.
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
Further, in using the income approach for valuing the lots in The Preserve
Development Project, the appraiser clearly relied on the "offers" for the 14 lots. In the
Income Approach section of the appraisal, the appraiser states that the offers on the lots
were used as comparables. On page 57 is a chart that refers to the sale of lots 51, 52, 53,
54, 55,49,40 and 39. See Exhibit "B" attached hereto. All of these lots were subject to the
purchase agreements Plaintiffs allege were entered into fraudulently. The chart also
includes a Date of Sale which refers to the date the "offers" were made. Page 58 of the
appraisal lists lots 33 through 35, lots 37, 38 and 50 as comparables, using the amount
"offered" as the value. See Exhibit "B.".
On page 68 of the appraisal, the appraiser notes that "the subject property has
already sold several one acre lots between $325,000.00 and $340,000.00." See Exhibit "C"
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attached hereto. Again, the appraiser clearly relied on the "offers" in making his appraisal
of the property.
The chart contained on page 69 of the appraisal also shows the value of lots 37, 38,
39 and 40 as the value of the "offer" and lists the value as "Lot Sale Price." See Exhibit "D"
attached hereto. The chart on page 71 of the appraisal lists the values for lots 33, 34, 35,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55 as the sales price of the "offer" and states that the value is the
"Lot Sale Price." See Exhibit "D." The lot purchase agreements themselves are included
in the appendix to the appraisal.
Plaintiffs have clearly plead that the "offers" were not real offers, that they were made
with the intention of artificially raising the values of the real property, that they were supplied
to the appraiser by David Simpson and Nathan Simpson for the purpose of raising the
values in the appraisal, that the offers were indeed used by the appraiser and that
MagnetBank, to its detriment, relied on the appraisal.

Therefore, Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint regarding the misrepresentations made to MagnetBank meets the
particularity requirements imposed by Rule 9.
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs must allege exactly which assets
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson over-valued in their financial statements submitted to
MagnetBank, which liabilities were under-stated and the amount of each liability. However,
the Simpson Defendants do not refer to any case law or other controlling precedent to
support their argument. The Simpson Defendants would require that Plaintiffs have in their
possession all the information from discovery before filing a complaint.
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Further, Plaintiffs specifically allege that neither David Simpson's nor Nathan
Simpson's financial statements reflected any amounts owed to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint sets forth with great detail the amounts owed to Plaintiffs by David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson. Paragraph 323 of the Second Amended Complaint clearly
describes the

promissory note executed by The Preserve at Mapleton Development

Company, LLC ("The Preserve") in favor of LD III, LLC ("LD III") in the amount of
$6,800,000.00. A review of the financial statements David Simpson and Nathan Simpson
submitted to MagnetBank, which are attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as
Exhibits 119 through 121, clearly demonstrates that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson
failed to include the amounts owed to LD III and Leslie.
Paragraph 325 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint clearly describes the
promissory note from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson personally to Leslie D. Mower
("Leslie") in the amount of $6,800,000.00. Paragraph 326 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint clearly describes a promissory note from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson
personally to Leslie in the amount of $3,300,000.00.
The financial statements submitted by David Simpson and Nathan Simpson to
MagnetBank, which are attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, show that there
is no mention of the amounts owed to Leslie.

It is disingenuous for the Simpson

Defendants to argue that they do not have a clearly defined foundation so the proceedings
can go forward in an orderly manner. Even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint explains what amounts were owed to Leslie but which were not included in David
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Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's financial statements. There is no mention in David
Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's financial statements of any funds owing to Leslie. The
promissory notes from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson to Leslie and LD III are clearly
explained and attached to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint

There is no doubt

regarding what amounts Plaintiffs allege were owed to Leslie that were not included on the
financial statements. Further, Rule 9 does not require that Plaintiffs include the detail being
demanded by the Simpson Defendants. It is clear what funds were owed to Plaintiffs and
that they were not included on the financial statements.
The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege how MagnetBank's
position changed as a result of the fact that David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Michael
Aviano ("Aviano") misrepresented the purchase price that Aviano paid for lot in The
Preserve Development Project. There is no requirement that Plaintiffs show as part of a
fraud claim that MagnetBank changed its position. The Simpson Defendants assert the
requirement without supplying any support for such a requirement. Plaintiffs need only
allege that MagnetBank relied on the misrepresentation to its detriment and that it was
damaged. The Simpson Defendants also wrongly argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege what
particular damages were caused by the Aviano sale.
Plaintiffs allege the false closing documents were provided to MagnetBank and its
participating bank and that in reliance on the false closing documents MagnetBank reduced
the amount they required to be paid for MagnetBank to release the security interest in
Aviano's lot. Plaintiffs further allege that if MagnetBank and its participating bank had
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known the true sales price and that the closing documents were false, they would not have
allowed the purchase to go forward, they would have had reason to suspect that the loan
was in peril and they would have taken steps to protect the loan. Plaintiffs also allege that
if MagnetBank and its participating bank had known the truth, they would have immediately
called the loan due, and that they were induced to not call the loan due and to take other
protective measures because of the false closing documents signed by Aviano, which he
knew would be submitted to MagnetBank and its participating bank.
Plaintiffs allege that MagnetBank and its participating bank would not have approved
the sale of a lot to Aviano and that they would not have agreed to accept the $900,000.00
payment had they known the truth.

Plaintiffs allege that had MagnetBank and its

participating bank known the truth, they would have at the very least insisted on payment
of the previously agreed release price of $1,020,000.00. Plaintiffs also clearly allege that
had MagnetBank and its participating bank known the truth, they would have called the loan
to The Preserve due and would have taken additional steps to protect their loan. However,
because

of

David

Simpson's,

Nathan

Simpson's

and

Aviano's,

fraud

and

misrepresentations, MagnetBank and its participating bank believed the lots in The
Preserve Development Project were actually worth what David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson had represented they were worth, not nearly half that value. Therefore, Plaintiffs
have sufficiently alleged the fraud and the damage from the fraud. Taking all the allegations
as true and making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, Plaintiffs clearly meet the
pleading standard regarding the Aviano transaction.
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DOUBLE T RANCH WATER PURCHASE

The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent nondisclosure in relation to the Double T Ranch water purchase must fail because Plaintiffs fail
to allege how the non-disclosures resulted in damage. The Simpson Defendants again
attempt to impose their own heightened pleading requirements, without any supporting
authority.
Plaintiffs clearly allege that Leslie's funds were wrongfully taken and used to partially
fund the purchase price of the water shares. Plaintiffs also clearly allege that David
Simpson purchased the water shares in the name of his own entity, that Leslie was never
reimbursed for her funds that were wrongfully taken and used, that Leslie never received
any profits from the sale of such water shares and that David Simpson wrongfully kept some
of the water shares for himself.
Further, Plaintiffs clearly allege that LD Ill's funds were wrongfully taken, that they
were used to purchase water shares which were titled in an entity owned by David Simpson,
that LD III was never reimbursed for its funds and that the water shares were sold and that
LD III never received any proceeds. It is clear that LD III and Leslie were damaged in that
their funds were taken and never repaid. If all reasonable inferences are extended to
Plaintiffs, it is clear that the Simpson Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint in relation to the claims regarding the Double T Ranch water purchase must be
denied.
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MAPLE MOUNTAIN WATER PROJECT

The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for fraud regarding the Maple
Mountain Water project must be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to plead the fraud with the
required particularity. However, Plaintiffs have clearly alleged the fraud with the required
particularity.
In paragraph 479 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that
Leslie provided The Preserve $281,693.59, with the understanding that it would be used to
pay The Preserve's share of the water tank cost. Instead, the funds were not used for the
water tank but were taken by Nathan Simpson and David Simpson. Paragraph 1094 of
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleges that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson
told Leslie's son that The Preserve needed at least $281,693.59 to pay past due bills, much
of that amount being required to pay The Preserve's share of the water tank. Paragraph
1096 alleges that at the end of March or beginning of April, David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson again told Leslie's son that they needed additional funds for The Preserve's share
of the water tank cost. Paragraph 1099 alleges that between November 15,2007 and April
23, 2008, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson repeatedly solicited Leslie and her
representatives for funds to pay past due bills of The Preserve. Paragraph 1101 clearly
states that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson used funds they had requested and
received from Leslie to pay Nathan Simpson $72,814.78 and to pay David Simpson
$65,000.00 instead of using the funds to pay The Preserve's share of the water tank costs.
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Contrary to the Simpson Defendants arguments, there is no attempt by Plaintiffs to
"cryptically attempt to bolster" their general allegations. Plaintiffs clearly allege that David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson represented they needed funds to pay the debts of The
Preserve, specifically The Preserve's share of the water tank cost, that when they received
the funds they used them for other purposes, such as paying themselves and using the
funds to pay The Presidio's share of the water tank cost. David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson had previously entered into a contract to purchase real property owned by The
Presidio and were obligated to pay part of The Presidio's share of the water tank cost as
part of the purchase. It is clear that Leslie furnished the funds in reliance on David
Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's misrepresentations and that she was damaged because
here funds were deceitfully taken.

Therefore, contrary to the Simpson Defendants'

statement that "the Court and the defendants are left to guess what Mower did in response
to these alleged misrepresentations and how it damaged her," Plaintiffs clearly allege that
her funds were used for purposes other than those for which they were provided and that
she no longer has the funds. Such is clear from even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint

Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Complaint should be denied.
FAILURE TO JOIN ESTATE OF KEN DOLEZSAR

The Simpson Defendants argue that Dolezsar is the "central figure" in this case and
that Doleszar's estate is a necessary and indispensable party to this action. The Simpson
Defendants fail to describe in what way Dolezsar is the "central figure" in this matter. There
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can be little doubt that the central figures in this matter are David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson. It is nothing more than a red herring.
The Simpson Defendants argue that the Estate of Ken Dolezsar (the "Estate") is a
necessary and indispensable party that cannot be joined. Therefore, they argue that
Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii development scam, The Preserve at
Mapleton Development scam and the commercial property scam must be dismissed
because they cannot proceed in equity and good conscience. The Simpson Defendants
argue that they are prevented from asserting their claims against Dolezsar and from
otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial
testimony.
However, the reasons put forth by the Simpson Defendants for finding that the
Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary and an indispensable parties do not meet the
standard set forth in Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The burden of

presenting specific facts and reasoning is on the party attempting to persuade the Court that
Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary or indispensable parties. See Grand County v.
Rogers, 2002 UT 25, fl29; 44 P.3d 734, 741 (Utah 2002). "[Abstract generalizations are
not a substitute for the analysis required under Rule 19." Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767
P.2d 941, 945 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). Simply alleging that Dolezsar is the cental figure and
that the defendants will be prevented from pursuing any cross claims against Dolezsar does
not establish that Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary or indispensable parties. Such
conclusory statements do not satisfy the required analysis under Rule 19. The Simpson
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Defendants have failed to carry their burden to show that Dolezsar and/or the Estate are
necessary and indispensable parties. Therefore, their claim should be denied.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible.. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
described in Subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping
of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
In addressing a Rule 19 issues, a court must first determine whether a party is
necessary under Rule 19(a) See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 864 (Ut. Ct. App.
2002). In doing so it considers the factors set out in the rule. If a court concludes that a
party is necessary, it then must "consider whether joinder of the necessary party is
feasible." Id.
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Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is "substantively similar to its federal
counterpart" and federal case law may be used as guidance. Seftel v. Capital City Bank,
767 P.2d 941,944 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, cases interpreting Rule 19 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have precedential value in the courts of the State of Utah.
The Simpson Defendants argue that Dolezsar and the Estate are necessary parties.
The Simpson Defendants rely primarily on Turville v. J&J Properties, L C , 2006 UT App
305; 145 P.3d 1146 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006) to support their argument that Dolezsar and/or the
Estate are necessary parties. However, the only similar fact in Turville and this matter is
that someone died and could not be made a party to the case. Otherwise, the facts are
very different.
The Simpson Defendants allege that Dolezsar was the central figure in this matter,
and, based only on their conclusory statement, argue that Dolezsar is just like Mr. Clark in
Turville. However, a close examination of the facts in Turville shows that it is David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson who performed the fraudulent acts like those alleged to have
been done by Mr. Clark, not Dolezsar.
In Turville, James Ritchie ("Ritchie"), John Quitiquit ("Quitiquit") and Clark Properties,
Inc. ("CPI"), whose officers were Mrs. and Mr. Clark, formed Tri-J Properties, LLC ("Tri-J")
for the purpose of buying 142 acres of real property from Davis County. Tri-J won the bid
on the property and it was transferred to Tri-J. Unbeknownst to the other members of Tri-J,
Mr. Clark ("Clark") executed a quitclaim deed for the property from Tri-J to CPI. Clark then
deeded 128 acres back to CPI and retained 14 acres in the name of CPI. See Id. at 1f2.
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Turville, the plaintiff in the action, met with Ritchie, Quitiquit and Clark in hopes of
purchasing the property.

Tri-J's members were undecided regarding selling the real

property. However, Clark informed Turville that CPI owned the 128 acres and that he had
authority to sell both the 128 acres and the 14 acres to Turville. Clark subsequently agreed
to sell the properties to Turville for $1,000,000.00. Clark caused CPI to deed the 128 acres
to Turville and gave Turville a quitclaim deed for CPIfs interest in the 14 acres, promising
that he could convince the other members of Tri-J to sell the 14 acre parcel to Turville.
Turville gave Clark a note for $1,000,000.00 and began developing the properties. See Id.

atfflI3-4.
Tri-J and CPI sued Turville claiming he had no legal right to the properties. Clark
then made a deal with Ritchie and Quitiquit that they would receive a portion of the
proceeds of the $1,000,00.00 note. The lawsuit was then dismissed. See Id. at ^7.
Later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Tri-J, Ritchie, Quitiquit, J&J Properties, CPI,
Mrs. Clark and Clark. Turville served Ritchie but took no further action. Later, Turville filed
for a default against Ritchie. Then Clark died of cancer. See Id. at 1HJ8-9. Several of the
defendants moved the court to dismiss the complaint because of failure to join the estate
of Mr. Clark as an indispensable party. See Id. at 1117. Ultimately, the trial court, and later
the Utah Court of Appeals, found that Clark's estate was a necessary and indispensable
party.
The Simpson Defendants argue that the present case is just like Turville because,
like Clark, Dolezsar was the person "primarily involved" in the alleged conduct that caused
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Plaintiffs' damages3. However, even a cursory reading of Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint show that the those primarily involved in the alleged conduct that caused
Plaintiffs' damages were David Simpson and Nathan Simpson.
The activity, involvement and roles of Clark and the activity, involvement and roles
of Dolezsar are readily distinguishable.

Here, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint

alleges that Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent. See Second Amended Complaint,
ffl]542, 601, 718 and 864. It was in his capacity as Leslie's husband and agent that he
relayed the misrepresentations made by David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others to
Leslie. Dolezsar only relayed David Simpson's ans Nathan Simpson's representations, he
did not make them.
In Turville, it is clear that the person who made the misrepresentations and
committed the fraud was Clark. Plaintiffs do not allege that Dolezsar was the source of the
misrepresentations or the source of the fraud. He was simply the go between used by
David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others. Therefore, his situation is quite different from
Clark's.
Further, in finding that Clark was a necessary and indispensable party, the Utah
Court of Appeals found it important that the complaint filed by Turville actually named Clark
as a defendant. See Id. at U40. The Utah Court of Appeals specifically cites to cases which
hold that when a plaintiff makes no claims against an unjoined party, it is clear that
3

On page 17 of their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint,
the Simpson Defendants state, "noting his 'pivotal representative role ... in the transactions at issue/ the trial
court found that Clark was a necessary party to the case. Id. at p . A careful reading of paragraph 9 of
Turville shows that it contains no such language.
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complete relief can be granted in [the party's] absence. See Id. (referring to Mallalieu-Golder
Ins. Agency v. Executive Risklndem., 254 F.Supp.2d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The Court
of Appeals goes on to say that "Plaintiff's reason for naming and including Mr. Clark is
apparent where the record reveals that it was primarily, if not solely, the actions of Mr.
Clark in his individual capacity that led to Plaintiffs alleged damages." Id. (emphasis
added). Here, it is the actions of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others which
primarily, if not solely, led to Plaintiffs' damages.
The Utah Court of Appeals cited the case of Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61 for the
proposition that a party was not a necessary party because the plaintiff's claims were
expressly limited to the defendants acts or omissions." See Id. In other words, because
Plaintiffs in this matter have limited their claims to the named defendants and have not
made any claims against Dolezsar or the Estate, neither Dolezsar nor the Estate are
necessary parties.
While the Turville court found that Clark's estate was a necessary and indispensable
party, the factual basis for those conclusions is very different from the facts in this matter.
Regarding Clark's status as an indispensable party, the court found that "because Plaintiff
named or included Mr. Clark in his claims as the major, if not the sole actor responsible for
Plaintiffs alleged damages, a judgment rendered in the Estate of Mr. Clark's absence would
prejudice those already parties to the action; protective provisions would not ameliorate this
prejudice; a judgment entered in the Estate of Mr. Clark's absence would be less than
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adequate; and, most importantly, as a result of the foregoing factors, the nonjoinder of the
Estate of Mr. Clark would violate principle of equity and good conscience." Id. at Tf42.
The Turville court clearly based its decision on the very important fact that the plaintiff
had identified Clark as the major actor and as a defendant.

Despite the Simpson

Defendants' best efforts to decide for Plaintiffs' who caused their damages and despite their
best efforts to shift responsibility for their misrepresentations made in this matter to
Dolezsar, the facts are that they are the main actors who are primarily responsible for
Plaintiffs' damages, not Dolezsar. Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' reliance on Turville
is misplaced and their Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint should be denied.
The Simpson Defendants argue they will not be able to question Dolezsar concerning
the origin of the information he passed on to Leslie because of his untimely death. They
fail to explain how, if Plaintiffs had filed this action before the time to make claims against
the Estate had lapsed, it would have allowed them to question Dolezsar concerning the
origin of the representations. It is just another attempt to shift the focus of the wrongdoing
from themselves to Dolezsar.
The Simpson Defendants also argue that any judgment issued in Dolezsar's absence
will result in unavoidable prejudice to the other defendants. They argue that the defendants
in this matter will be "unable to require Dolezsar to account for his alleged conduct at a
deposition or a trial in this matter. It is important to note that the scope of Rule 19 deals
with making persons parties to the litigation, not with the availability of evidence because
of the death of a person.

The Simpson Defendants cannot argue that having the
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opportunity to join the Estate as a party would allow them to conduct depositions or examine
Dolezsar at trial. Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' argument that the Estate is an
indispensable party because the Simpson Defendants will be prejudiced because of their
inability to question Dolezsar must fail. Such an argument has noting to do with joinder of
a party.
If the Court finds that Dolezsar or the Estate are necessary parties, it then must move
to the second prong of the analysis and decide if Dolezsar or the Estate are indispensable
parties. The United States Supreme Court has analyzed Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.

In the seminal case of Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.

Patterson, 309 U.S. 102 (1968) the Court stated "Rule 19 (b) suggests four interests that
must be examined in each case to determine whether in equity and good conscience the
court should proceed without a party whose absence from the litigation is compelled." Id.
at 109. The United States Supreme court went on to list the interests as:
First, the plaintiff has an interest in having a forum. Before the trial, the
strength of this interest obviously depends upon whether a satisfactory
alternative forum exists. ... Second, the defendant may properly wish to
avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a
liability he shares with another. ... Third, there is an interest of the outsider
whom it would have been desirable to join. ... Fourth, there remains the
interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient
settlement of controversies. We read the Rule's third criterion, whether the
judgment issues in the absence of the nonjoined person will be 'adequate,' to
refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible....
Id. at 109-111.
Here, Plaintiffs' have a great interest in having a forum. There is no other forum
available where Plaintiffs could bring their claims. If the case is dismissed, Plaintiffs will be
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prevented from pursuing any remedy for the fraud perpetrated against them. Further, there
is no danger of multiple litigation or inconsistent relief. Lastly, it is in the interest of the
courts and the public to be able to settle controversies and have redress for alleged wrongs.
All of the factors listed by the United States Supreme Court support a denial of the
Simpson's Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint based on Rule 19.
The Simpson Defendants argue that any judgment issued in the absence of the
Estate will be inadequate. They argue that none of the defendants in this case will be able
to bring any related claims against the Estate, such as cross claims or claims for
contribution.
However, the inability to bring a cross claim against another party does not make that
party an indispensable party. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated, "it is well-established that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint tortfeasors.
Nor does it require the joinder of principal and agent. Finally, Rule 19 does not require the
joinder of persons against whom [the parties] have claim for contribution." Nottingham v.
General American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987), See also
Milligan v. Anderson, 522 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 1975); Dennis v. Wachovia
Securities, 429 F.Supp. 2d 281, 290 (D. Mass. 2006).
"[A] defendant's right to contribution or indemnity from an absent non-diverse party
does not render that absentee indispensable pursuant to Rule 19." Gardiner v. Virgin
Islands Water & Power Authority, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3rd Cir. 1998). The Gardiner court
added that "the possibility that the defendant may have a claim for contribution or indemnity
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does not render an absentee indispensable. The right of contribution and indemnity should
not, therefore, be considered to cause inadequacy of the resulting judgment." Further,
when considering whether a judgment will be adequate, the proper inquiry is whether the
remedy will be adequate from a plaintiffs point of view. See Provident Tradesmens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Patterson, 309 U.S. 102, 112 (1968). Here, Plaintiffs will have an adequate
remedy without the joinder of Dolezsar or the Estate.
The Simpson Defendants argument is based on the fact that they will not be able to
pursue the Estate for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Therefore, they have failed to carry
their burden. The Estate is not a necessary and indispensable party.
The last factor that a court must consider is whether the plaintiff will have an
alternate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. The Simpson Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs' other causes of action for breach of contract, quasi contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment provide a remedy for any alleged wrongs.
However, the Simpson Defendants are again wrong.
Plaintiffs other claims do not address the fraud that was perpetrated against them.
If Plaintiffs causes of action for fraud are dismissed pursuant to Rule 19, Plaintiffs will have
no remedy for those wrongs. There is no other venue or court available for Plaintiffs to bring
their claims. See Id.
The Simpson Defendants would have the Court believe that pursuant to Rule 19
Plaintiffs1 fraud causes of action must be dismissed because they do not have the
opportunity to press cross claims against the Estate. They would categorize Rule 19 as
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being there to protect their rights against other possible defendants. However, as explained
above, such is not the purpose of the rule. "The basic purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the
interests of absent persons as well as those already before the court from multiple litigation
or inconsistent judicial determinations." Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment,
839 P.2d 1101 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995). Further, "[t]he purpose of rule 19 is to protect against
the entry of judgments which might prejudice the rights of indispensable parties in their
absence." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049,1054-55 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). Here,
there is no possibility of prejudice to the Estate. Further, the Simpson Defendants are not
in danger of being subject to multiple litigation or inconsistent judgments. Therefore, the
Simpson Defendants' motion to dismiss the fraud claims pursuant to Rule 19 must be
denied.
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE

The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that Leslie relied on David
Simpson's fraudulent non-disclosures in relation to the Double T Ranch water purchase.4
The Simpson Defendants, relying on an unpublished opinion, claim that Plaintiffs must
allege reliance by Leslie to pursue their cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure.
However, the standard proclaimed by the Simpson Defendants is wrong.

4

The Simpson Defendants rely on the case of Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. v. Foianini, 2008 UT App 463
for the standard of pleading a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure. However. Barber Bros, is a
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and states it is "NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION."
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants cannot rely on it as authority and it cannot be cited as precedent. See
Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25 1f7; 44 P.3d 734, 736 (Utah 2002)(stating court of appeals'
memorandum decisions designated as such are not published and cannot be relied upon as precedent).
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed the elements of fraudulent non-disclosure in
Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47. The court stated that "[i]n order to prevail on
a claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to
disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate." Id. at 1J10. Here, Plaintiffs
allege that David Simpson failed to disclose material and relevant facts, that such facts were
material and that David Simpson had a duty to disclose the facts. Therefore, contrary to the
Simpson Defendants1 argument, Plaintiffs have alleged all the necessary elements for their
claim of fraudulent non-disclosure regarding the Double T Ranch water purchase.
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants1 motion to dismiss should be denied.
AIDING AND ABETTING CLAIMS IN UTAH

The Simpson Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting breach
of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure are not recognized by
Utah courts and therefore must be dismissed. To support their argument, the Simpson
Defendants cites to language from Colores v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (Ut.
Ct. App. 2003) in which the Colores court declined to decide whether claims for aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty are recognized in Utah. The Colores court stated, "since
we decide the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claim on the basis discussed
above, we do not need to decide the issue, reached by the trial court, of whether this
cause of action is cognizable under Utah law in the first place." Id. at FN 19 (emphasis
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added). Just because the Colores court declined to reach the issue, does not mean that
such a claim is not cognizable in Utah.
Causes of action for aiding and abetting are recognized by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, §876. A majority of states have adopted the validity of a claim for aiding
and abetting under the Restatement. See Dale v. ALA Acquisitions, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d
694,700 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (listing states that have adopted the validity of claims for aiding
and abetting). Therefore, the court should allow Plaintiffs to proceed with their aiding and
abetting claims.

CONCLUSION

On a motion to dismiss the Court must take all allegations contained in Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint as true and it must make all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiffs1 favor. Further, the Court must resolve all doubts in Plaintiffs' favor. Applying that
standard, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint clearly and adequately asserts causes of
action against the Simpson Defendants for fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure and aiding and
abetting fraudulent non-disclosure. Plaintiffs have plead all of their fraud based claims with
the particularity required by Rule 9. Further, the Simpson Defendants have failed carry their
burden and show that Dolezsar or the Estate are either necessary or indispensable parties.
Therefore, the Simpson Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint should
be denied and Plaintiffs should be awarded their reasonable costs and fees incurred in
addressing the Simpson Defendants motion.
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs hereby request oral argument on the Simpson Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
DATED this 26th day of April, 2010
Bailey & Jennings, LC

William T. Jennings
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of April, 2010,1 served a true an correct
copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to the Simpson Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Second Amended Complaint on the following by mailing the same, United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Chris D. Greenwood
1840 North State St., Suite 200
Provo, UT 84604

Jonathan L. Jaussi
P.O. Box 460
Payson, UT 84651

Craig J. Carlile
86 North University Ave., Suite 430
Provo, UT 84601

Julian D. Jensen
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Mark D. Eddy
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd.
Suite 202
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062

Steven R. Sumsion
86 North University Ave., Suite 400
Provo, UT 84601

Laura S. Scott
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Jennings
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Craig Carlile (0571)
Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
86 North University Avenue, #430
Provo,Utah 84601-4420
Telephone: (801)342-2400
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu
Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Lnc, Wood Springs, LLC, Oak LeafInvestments, LLC,
Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS
Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton
Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC,
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank LLC,
andKathy A. Templeman
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al.,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

v.
DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al.,
Defendants
and
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al.,
Rule 19 Defendants.

Civil No: 090403844
Judge: Samuel D. McVey

Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu Plantation,
LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc., Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC, Dente,
LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS
Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton
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Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC,
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC,
and Kathy A. Templeman hereby move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs
Leslie D. Mower, LD SQ, LLC, LD III, LLC, LD Purpose, LLC, and Navona, LC (collectively,
"Plaintiffs"), pursuant to Rules 8(a), 9(b), 12(b)(6), and 19(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The grounds for this motion are that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint again fails to
meet the basic pleading requirements of Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court previously dismissed the allegations of fraud in Plaintiffs' 216-page First
Amended Complaint because they did not contain the level of particularly required under Rule
9(b). Despite now spanning 361 pages, the Second Amended Complaint still fails to provide the
concise particularity required by the pleading standards under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and, therefore, must be dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's
ex-husband who was killed in November 2007) must be dismissed for failure to join an
indispensible party under Rule 19(b). Ken Dolezsar is the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs
affirmatively allege that all of the claimed misrepresentations with respect to the Hawaii
development, the Mapleton development, and the Springville property were communicated to
Mower by Dolezsar, who was allegedly acting in conspiracy with Defendants David Simpson
and Nathan Simpson. However, Dolezsar cannot be joined because Plaintiffs failed to bring this
case within the one year statute of limitations for claims against Dolezsar's estate after his death.
The other defendants
are bythus
prevented
from
asserting
their
claims
against
Digitized
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otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial
testimony. Under these circumstances, the fraud-based claims related to Dolezsar must be
dismissed under Rule 19(b).
Plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent nondisclosure with respect to the alleged purchase of
water shares from Double T Ranch should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim because
Plaintiffs fail to allege any justifiable reliance resulting in damages.
Finally, Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and
abetting fraudulent nondisclosure should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as Utah courts
have not recognized a cognizable civil cause of action for "aiding and abetting."
Therefore, as more fully stated in the supporting memorandum filed contemporaneously
herewith, the Court should (1) dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud allegations for failure to plead in
accordance with Rules 8(a) and 9(b); (2) dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims related to the
Hawaii Development (Claim Nos. 1, 4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11,
14-16,19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Claim Nos. 21, 22, 24, and 25) under Rule
19(b) for failing to join an indispensible party; (3) dismiss Plaintiffs fraudulent nondisclosure
claim with respect to the Double T Ranch water purchase (Claim No. 32) under Rule 12(b)(6);
and (4) dismiss Plaintiff's claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty (Claim Nos. 3,
and 13) and aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure (Claim Nos. 5, and 15) under Rule
12(b)(6).
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DATED this/jT'day
of April, 2010.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Craig Carlile
Calej/J. Frischknecht
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT was mailed by First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
on this j j O l a y of April, 2010 to the following:
Bail I Baile.}

William T. Jennings
BAILEY & JENNINGS, LC
" " South State Street
i.Utah 84058
Steven R. Sumsion
Spencer MacDonald
Daniel M. Woods
SUMSION & MACDONALD
86 North University Avenue, #400
Provo,Utah 84601-4420
Mark D.Eddy
Morgan L. Cummings
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY &. i IA \\' S, i> ('
233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Julian D. Jensen
Attorney at Law
311 South State Street, #380
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Joshua P. Langeland
P.O. Box 460
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Vanrus Law Group
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Craig Carlile (0571)
Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.r.
86 North University Avenue, #430
Provo,Utah 84601-4420
Telephone: (801) 342-2400
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R, Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu
Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc., Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf Investments, LLC,
Dente} LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJDevelopment, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS
Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton
Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC,
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC,
andKathy A. Templeman
IN' THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY; STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al.,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
1 T

DAVID R. SIMPSON,

ividual; et al.,

Defendants
and
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al.,
Rule 19 Defendants.

Civil No: 090403844
Judge: Samuel D. McVey

Defendants David R Simpson, Nathan. R, Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu Plantation,
LLC, Landmark Real Estate Iiic W< >< >d Springs, I I C, Oak I c ;af In\ < sstments, I I € Dente,
LLC, Sunny Ridge, I LC, KNDJ Development, LLC, DN Simpson. Holdings, LLC, SOS
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Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Camesecca Orchard Estates, LLC,
Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC,
and Kathy A. Templeman submit this memorandum in support of their Motion to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint.
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INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint again fails to meet the basic pleading
requirements of Rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court previously
dismissed the allegations of fraud in Plaintiffs' 216-page First Amended Complaint because they
did not contain the level of particularly required under Rule 9(b). At that time, Plaintiffs were
given a "chance to plead fraud within 20 days . . . and do it concisely and with particularity."
(Ruling Granting in Part the Various Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (emphasis added).)
Plaintiffs have responded by adding 145 more unnecessary pages to their Second Amended
Complaint. Despite now spanning 361 pages, the Second Amended Complaint still fails to
provide the concise particularity required by the pleading standards under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. As Plaintiffs have now failed on all three of their chances, their improperly-pleaded
fraud claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims with respect to the Hawaii development, the
Mapleton development, and the Springville property must be dismissed for failure to join an
indispensible party under Rule 19. As demonstrated by the allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint, Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower's ex-husband who was killed in November 2007) is
the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that all of the claimed
misrepresentations with respect to these three transactions were communicated to Mower by
Dolezsar, who was allegedly acting in conspiracy with Defendants David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson. However, Plaintiffs failed to bring this case within the one year statute of limitations
for claims againstDigitized
Dolezsar's
estateW.after
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Ann.
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Consequently, Dolezsar cannot be made a party to this case, The other defendants are thus

account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial testimony. Under these
circumstances, the fraud based clai ms related to the I la v\ aii d e v e l o p m e n t , the IV laplet : n
development, and the Springville property cannot proceed in equin and good conscience in
Dolezsar's absence. Accordingly, these claims must be ui si, u;>^u t..,*;ci w^v. r ..Plaintiffs' claim,,, for fraudulent nondisclosure with respect to the alleged purchase of
water shares from i double f Ranch should also be dismissed for failure to state a clai*:*.
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Amended Complaint on November 27, 2009, which contained 216 pages and 713 numbered
paragraphs. (First, Amended Complaint.)
3.

The First Amended Complaint prompted several more motions to dismissfixm
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4.

On January 22, 2010, the Court "dismisse[d] the fraud allegations arising

throughout the Amended Complaint since they [did] not contain the required level of
particularity" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (Ruling Granting in Part the Various
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, dated January 22, 2010, attached hereto as Ex. A (hereinafter,
"January 22, 2010 Order").)
5.

The Court granted Plaintiffs a "chance to plead fraud within 20 days [of the

January 22, 2010 Order] and do it concisely and with particularity." {Id. (emphasis added).)
6.

On March 5, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter

"Complaint"), which now contains 361 pages, 48 causes of action and 1362 numbered
paragraphs.
7.

Then, on March 12, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an 11-page Notice of Errata Regarding

Second Amended Complaint.
8.

The claims alleged in the Complaint primarily arisefromtwo real property

developments: a condominium development on the island of Kauai in Hawaii (the "Hawaii
Development") and an up-scale residential subdivision in Mapleton, Utah called The Preserve at
Mapleton (the "Mapleton Development").
9.

In Claim Nos. 1-10, Plaintiffs allege claims related to the Hawaii Development

forfraud,breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent
nondisclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure, conversion, unjust enrichment,
conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act against the following
defendants: David Simpson; Nathan Simpson; Michael Thompson; Todd Dorny; Brandon Dente;
Wood Springs, LLC;
ALS
LLC;
Ke
Kula;Clark
Hanalei
KaiBYU.
Holdings, LLC; Ka
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Mahina, I ,LC; Dente, LLC; He Kaikolu, LLC; and Koamalu Plantation (collectively, the
"Hawaii Development Defendants").
10.

In the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege that

Ken Dolezsar (Plaintiff Mower" s late ex-hi isband) com muni : ate d i i it ID iber of
misrepresentations to Mower. Plaintiffs allege thai Dnlc/sa-

-OHMI

imitated these

misrepresentations to Mower at;e;* allegedly hearing t h a n l^-m Ua.iu Simpson ajiu . lu^-n
Simpson, either "in ignorance i ' *he Ih'sity of the representations or as part of a c o n s r r a e / ' with
the Simpsons. (Complaint *jj 543.)
11.

NCF '.••.•- * *;

* , K L ,. ions associated \ vdth the I lawaii Develo' • •

Plaintiffs allege thai the Simp?. v> r r ihe other Hawaii Development Defendants made any •
representations directly to Mo v\ er. ( C o m p l a i n t ^ 538 559.)
12.

In Claim Nos. 11-20, Plaintiffs allege claims related to the Mapleton

Development for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach ui
frai icii llent nondi sclosure, aiding a nil abetting frai ldi llent nondisclosure, conversion - yust
enrichment, conspiracy, and violation of the Utah Pattern, of Activity Act against the -Ah • wirw'i

Oak: Leaf, LLC; Sunny Ridge, I I ,C; KNDJ Development, I i C: i^N Simpson Holdings, LLC;
SOS Mapletc nDe <v elopment, I I ,C; DN Simpson I\ lapletonl I •. Mapleton Development Company, I I -C; Pheasant Meadow - . M i

• I ,C; I he: Pi esei ve at
* "arnesecca Orchard hstates,

LLC; Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC; Landmark Homes of U a h * . v ; David Nemelka. v. ..a*..
Carlson: 2 Brothers Coin mi uiications; A 1 len I la kes; I ' -.--^

i

:

' ''
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:

*.c ;

Lonestar Builders, LLC; Michael Marx; and Michael Aviano (collectively, the "Mapleton
Development Defendants").
13.

Similar to the fraud claims concerning the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege

Dolezsar communicated a number of misrepresentations to Plaintiff Mower concerning the
Mapleton Development. Again, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar communicated all of the alleged
misrepresentations directly to Mower, after allegedly hearing such misrepresentations from
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, and that he did so "as part of a conspiracy with the
Simpsons." (Complaintffi[721, 731, 734, 739, 757-758, 434, and 975.)
14.

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made any

misrepresentations directly to Mower. (Complaint ^[717-814.)
15.

As part of the claims related to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs assert

claims on behalf of Magnet Bank, which claims Plaintiffs appear to allege were acquired by
Plaintiff Navona, LC in February 2008. (Complaint f 793.)
16.

In the Magnet Bank fraud-based claims (Claim Nos. 11,14,15, 16, and 20.), -

Plaintiffs allege that the Mapleton Development Defendants made misrepresentations and
material omissions to Magnet Bank in connection with a loan extended by Magnet Bank for the
Mapleton Development. (See generally Complaint ^fl[ 766 -811.)
17.

In Claim Nos. 21-25, Plaintiffs allege claims for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy arising
from Mower's purchase of approximately 30 acres of real property in Springville, Utah (the
"Springville Property"). Plaintiffs assert these claims against David Simpson, Nathan Simpson,
Wood Springs, andDigitized
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Meadows
(collectively,
the "Springville
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18.

As in the claims related to the I law all Development and the I\ lapleton

Development, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar, "'whether duped by or compUcitous with the
Simpsons" communicated a number of alleged misrepresentations to Mower with respect to the
Springville Property (Complai i i t f | 4 3 1- i ind 101- I )
19.

Plaintiffs do not allege that the Springville Property Defendants made any

misrepresentations
20.

;

.

In C iaim N^s. ?^- *0. Plaintiffs allege claim- \^r iraud, negligent

misrepresentation, brea*. ii -.•; huJv.ia.rv uiu>. iiaudulent nondisclosure, and conspiracy against
David Simp?-. :-.

'- : *... "

•

liming the Simpsons made misrepresentations to Mower

through her "representatives" concerning Mapleton Development's share of costs for the
C

'

.i

•

:

• ,:j

;

•

• *•

•

;"

=

*:

: \

connection v -it" '.\e Maplelon Development (the "Maple Maintain Water Project";

JSee

generally Complaint f f 1094 110 ; )
21.

In Claim Nos. 31-32, Plaintiffs allege claim- '« ,r breach of fiduci,r\ d -::y and

fraudulent nondisclosure against David Simp-Min. c a n n i n g .MnipbOh iaiied u- d i ^ i . ^ co Mower
that he used funds from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares from a company named Double
T Ranch (the "Double T Water Purchase").
ARC

I.

•

r

PLAINTIFFS HAVE AGAIN FAILED TO PLEAD THEIR CLAIMS
ACCORDING TO THE PLEADING STANDARDS OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVn .PROCEDI JR E
Under the notice pleading requirements espou^ d h- r he Ulaii Rules of Civil Procedure,

Digitized
by the
Howard
W. Hunter
LawJor
Library,
J. Reuben
Lawnnd
School,
BYU. statement
plaintiffs are required
to set
forth
their
claims
relici
in ' .iClark
viort
plain
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Where fraud is at issue, "the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P.
9(a). Together, the purpose of these pleading Rules is "to require that the essential facts upon
which redress is sought be set forth with simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be
determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed." Heathman v. Hatch, 372
P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added).
As set forth in the Court's January 22, 2010 Order, Rule 9(b) requires that Plaintiffs
allege "who in particular said or represented what to whom in particular, when, where, and how
such representations occurred, the specific terminology used, why reliance was reasonable and
what particular damages were caused by each discrete action." (January 22, 2010 Order ^2.)

-

These requirements apply not only to "allegations of common-law fraud," but extend to "all
circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other
deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its broadest dimension." Williams v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). Thus, Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements apply to Plaintiffs'
common law fraud claims as well as their claims for aiding and abetting fraud, conspiracy, and
violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Practices Act, insofar as they are based on
circumstances of fraud.
Despite having now filed three complaints, along with a lengthy "notice of errata,"
Plaintiffs have yet again failed to plead their fraud-based claims with the particularly required by
Rule 9(b). Rather than providing the necessary particularly, Plaintiffs have merely lengthened
their Complaint (which now totals 361 pages and contains 1,362 paragraphs) by an additional
145 pages. For example,
fillHunter
20 pages
of their
Complaint
withBYU.
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not minutia

from credit card statements to claim, that Defendants David and. Nathan Simpson

expenses, (Complaintffif179-198..)
Y et. Plaintiffs routinely fail to prov ide the necessary particularity with respect to their
fraud claims. For example, as part of the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development,
Plaintiffs make the following allegation:
737. Davu: '-\\ : M;II. -\~JA~:. :•..:.*;>A\.. aiiv. :\.^.. . nezsar also
represented to [Mowti j u iai the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used to fund
development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development project, that she
would receive a first position deed of trust securing a promissory note and that,
they would recc-r1 ^ e deed of trust in the office of the I Jtah County Recorder,
(Complaint ^f 737.) Plaintiffs do not specify who in particulai* made the alleged representations-- •
or when they were n;adv.

. -^.^ alleged mis;cprescntauons are among several, omcj ,^ aaiihui

with respect to the Mapleton Development. As outlined below, Plaintiffs allege that all of the
other claimed misrepresentations made to Mower concerning the Mapleton, Development were
{"orrifiiunic ateil \*\ I >. ile/sar lifter In1 ;illr|:c ill\ frreivccl infuniiation Irnm flic Simpson

[Si.

Complaint ^j 721, 731, 734, and 739.) Without the specifics as to "who in, particular said or

with respect to the alleged misrepresentations in paragraph 7 ; ' 7 f.wv January 22, 2010 Order),, the
Mapleton Development Defendants are left to guess as to "the substance oi ine acts constituting
the alleged wrong " Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971-72 (Utah 1982).
This example, and. those that follow,, illustrate that Plaintiffs' Complaint is "much too

1
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hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... the
facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,ffl[23,
27, 79 P.3d 974 (internal quotations omitted). As Plaintiffs have now failed to properly plead
their claims on their third attempt, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud claims without leave
to amend. U.S. ex rel Ritchie v. LockheadMartin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161,1166 (10th Cir. 2009)
(denial of leave to amend appropriate after "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed"). At a minimum, the Court should dismiss the fraud claims related to
Magnet Bank (part of Claim Nos. 11,14,15,16, and 20), the Double T Water Purchase (Claim
No. 32), and the Maple Mountain Water Project (Claim Nos. 26, 27, 29, and 30).
A.

Plaintiffs Fail to Plead the Fraud Claims of Magnet Bank With the
Particularly Required Under Rule 9(b) and the Court's January 22,2010
Order.

For example, Plaintiffs allege that David and Nathan Simpson somehow duped an
appraiser into using allegedly fraudulent "pre-sales" — which the appraisal itself clarifies were
offers — to arrive at the valuation of the Mapleton Development submitted to Magnet Bank in
connection with a loan application. (Complaint \ 787.) However, Plaintiffs do not plead any
allegations to explain what in particular about these offers made them fraudulent. They merely
allege, "on information and belief and without any supporting detail, that each of the
approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions." (Complaint Iffi 304, 298303.) Merely labeling the offers as "sham transactions" does not make them so. Plaintiffs do not
provide any explanation as to how or when the offers were "contrived." These conclusory
allegations carry no weight under Rule 9(b).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs also conclusorily allege that the Simpsons submitted false financial statements
to Magnet Bank in connection with the loan application. (Complaintfflf766-777.) Without
making any attempt to explain how, Plaintiffs merely allege that David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson's financial statements overstated their assets and understated their liabilities.
(Complaint Iffl 352, 353, 355, 771-773.) Plaintiffs fail to specify which of the several assets
listed in the statements in particular was overvalued, by how much each such asset was
overvalued, or why each such asset was otherwise improperly included. Plaintiffs further fail to
specify what liabilities in particular were understated or otherwise not included, and the amount
of each such liability. Plaintiffs conclusorily allege that the financial statements did not reflect
unspecified money allegedly owed by the Simpsons to Mower,- but provide no explanation as to
what debt they refer, how much money was owed, or how the money was owed — such as
money possibly owed through one of the several entities listed in the financial statements.
(Complaint 1774.) Rule 9(b) requires that this detail be pleaded "so that there will be a clearly
defined foundation upon which further proceedings . . . can go forward in an orderly manner."
Heathman, 372 P.2d at 992.
Plaintiffs further allege the Simpsons and Defendant Aviano falsely represented to
Magnet Bank that the sales price for Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 in the Mapleton Development
was $900,000. (Complaintfflf794-811.) Even though they admit that Magnet Bank actually
received $900,000 from the sale, Plaintiffs allege that the sales price was misrepresented because
Aviano allegedly only paid $575,000 and the Simpsons allegedly paid the rest. (Complaint ff
802-03.) However, Plaintiffs fail to explain how Magnet Bank's position changed as a result.
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the Aviano sale, Plaintiffs cannot claim that Magnet Bank somehow relied on the Aviano sale to
fund the loan. Furthermore, Plaintiffs make no attempt to allege "what particular damages were
caused" by the Aviano sale. (See January 22, 2010 Order ^f 2.) These allegations do not meet the
requirements in Rule 9(b) or the Court's Order.
In short, the Magnet Bank claims have not been pleaded with particularity and must be
dismissed.
B,

Plaintiffs Also Fail to Plead Their Fraud Claims With Respect to the Double
T Ranch Water Purchase With Rule 9(b) Particularity.

Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose a number of alleged
material facts to Mower concerning his alleged purchase of Double T Ranch's water shares.
(Complaint Yl 1175-79.) However, Plaintiffs completely fail to allege how such nondisclosures
resulted in any damage. Instead, Plaintiffs merely allege without any detail that they were
somehow damaged in the amount of $300,125.00. (Complaint^ 1182-83.) Thisdoesnot
comply with Rule 9(b) or the Court's January 22, 2010 Order.
C.

Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded With Particularity Their Fraud Claims
Concerning the Maple Mountain Water Project.

A final example of Plaintiffs' failure to plead required details is found in the fraud claims
related to the Maple Mountain Water Project. Plaintiffs generally allege that "[b]etween
November 15,2007 and April 23, 2008, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson repeatedly
solicited [Mower] and her representatives claiming [the] Simpsons needed funds to pay due and
past due bills of the Preserve" and that Mov/er provided money in response to these solicitations,
which money Plaintiffs claim was used for unauthorized purposes. (Complaint ^ 485,1099,
and 1103.) This allegation
is obviously lacking the detail required by Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs
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cryptically attempt to bolster this general allegation by alleging that on two occasions the
Simpsons falsely told Mower's son that the Mapleton Development needed funds to satisfy its
share of the costs for the Maple Mountain Water Project, which alleged false statements were
related to Mower. (Complaintfflf1094-1096.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege what specific
actions were taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations, when those actions were taken,
and "what particular damages were caused by each [of these] discrete action[s]." (January 22,
2010 Order Tf 2.) Thus, the Court and the defendants are left to guess what Mower did in
response to these alleged misrepresentations and how it damaged her.
As illustrated by the foregoing, Plaintiffs' 361-page Complaint remains deficient and
should be dismissed without leave to amend.
II.

PLAINTIFFS9 FRAUD-BASED CLAIMS RELATED TO KEN DOLEZSAR
MUST BE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 19(b) FOR FAILURE TO JOIN
DOLESZAR'S ESTATE.
The allegations in the Complaint demonstrate that Dolezsar is the central figure in this

case. Plaintiffs affirmatively plead that Mower received all of her information regarding the
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property from Dolezsar,
her late ex-husband. Indeed, each of the representations of which Plaintiffs complain with
respect to these projects was made by Dolezsar as a member of some alleged conspiracy to
defraud her.
Yet, Dolezsar is not a party to this case. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar was murdered in
Sandy, Utah on November 15, 2007. (Complaint f 400.) This case was filed in October 2009,
long after the expiration of the one year statute of limitations for claims against Dolezsar's estate.
See Utah Code Ann.Digitized
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to this case, preventing the other defendants from asserting their claims against Dolezsar and
from otherwise requiring Dolezsar to account for his alleged actions by way of deposition or trial
testimony. Under these circumstances, the fraud-based claims related to the Hawaii
Development (Claim Nos. 1, 4-6, 9, and 10), the Mapleton Development (Claim Nos. 11,14-16,
19, and 20), and the Springville Property (Ckiim Nos. 21, 22,24, and 25) cannot proceed in
equity and good conscience in Dolezsar's absence. Such claims must therefore be dismissed
under Rule 19.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of "necessary" parties
where feasible, and dismissal of the action in the absence of "indispensible" parties. Utah R.
Civ. P. 19(a>(b); Turville v. J&JProps., L.C., 2006 UT App 305,ffi[36-37,145 P.3d 1146.
Analysis under Rule 19 proceeds in two steps: First, the Court must determine whether an
absent party is necessary to the "just adjudication" of the action. Second, where an absent party
is found to be necessary to the action, but cannot feasibly be joined, the Court must determine
whether such party is indispensable such that the action must be dismissed in his absence.
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, atffi[36-37.
A.

Dolezsar Is Necessary to This Action Because Complete Relief Cannot Be
Accorded the Parties in His Absence.

A party is necessary to an action if "in [the party's] absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Complete relief is not possible in
the absence of a party who was primarily involved in the alleged conduct that caused the
plaintiffs damages. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, If 40. For example, in the case of Turville v.
J&J Properties, L.C., the plaintiff brought contract, fraud, conspiracy, and other claims against a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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company and its members related to a dispute concerning two real estate transactions. Id. at fflf
2-8. One of the defendants, named Clark, died before he was served with the complaint. Id. at
lf| at 9-10. After the plaintiff failed to join Clark's estate into the case, the other defendants
moved the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to join Clark's estate as a necessary and
indispensible party. Id. atfflf10, 17. Clark was the person with whom the plaintiff had primarily
dealt. Id. atffif3-6. Noting his "pivotal representative role . . . in the transactions at issue," the
trial court found that Clark was a necessary party to the case. Id. at \ 9. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that Clark was a necessary party because he was primarily involved in
the conduct that led to the plaintiffs alleged damages and, therefore, complete relief could not be
accorded among the parties in his absence. Id. at f 40.
Dolezsar is a necessary party to this action as complete relief cannot be accorded to the
parties in his absence. As did Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar is alleged to have played a
"pivotal representative role" in the misrepresentations alleged by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have
affirmatively pleaded that all of the alleged misrepresentations related to the Hawaii
Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to Mower
directly by Dolezsar, who Plaintiffs allege was a coconspirator with the Simpsons. (Complaint \
975.) For example, with respect to the Hawaii Development, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar
made the misrepresentations of which Plaintiffs complain to Mower, after hearing them from the
Simpsons, either "in ignorance of the falsity of the representations or as part of a conspiracy."
(Complaint 1543 (emphasis added).) Nowhere in the fraud allegations associated with the
Hawaii Development do Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Development Defendants made any
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misrepresentations with respect to the Hawaii Development were communicated to Mower by
Dolezsar. (Id) At most, Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Development Defendants instructed
Dolezsar to make the misrepresentations to Mower. (Complaint U 542.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
allegations establish that Dolezsar was the nexus for all of the conduct that Plaintiffs allege
caused them damage.
The same is true for the fraud claims related to the Mapleton Development and the
Springville Property. With respect to the Mapleton Development, Plaintiffs again allege that
Dolezsar made all of the alleged misrepresentations to Mower "as part of a conspiracy with the
Simpsons." (Complaintfflf721, 731, 734, 739, 757-758, and 434.)2 Plaintiffs do not allege that
the Mapleton Development Defendants made any misrepresentations directly to Mower.
(Complaint ff 717-814.) Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar, "whether duped by or
complicitous with the Simpsons" made the alleged misrepresentations to Mower with respect to
the Springville Property. (Complaintffl[434, 435,1014.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the
Springville Property Defendants made any misrepresentations directly to Mower. (Complaint i[fl[
435,435,1007-1035.)
Scrutiny of Plaintiffs' Complaint thus shows that Dolezsar is alleged to be the primary
perpetrator of Plaintiffs' claimed wrongs. Surely, had Dolezsar been alive when Plaintiffs filed
this case, they would have named and served him as a defendant. However, Dolezsar's untimely
death left Plaintiffs looking for other sources of recovery, leading to the 361-page Complaint
before the Court, which is completely devoid of any alleged misrepresentations made to Mower

2

As noted in Part LA above, Magnet Bank'sfraudclaims related to the Mapleton Development have not been
pleaded with particularity
andbymust
be dismissed.
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by anyone other than Dolezsar. Plaintiffs apparently base their allegations that the other
defendants were somehow involved in the alleged fraud solely on Dolezsar's statements to
Mower. However, the parties will not be able to question Dolezsar concerning the origin of his
alleged statements due to his untimely death. Moreover, none of the other defendants in this case
may proceed with their claims against Dolezsar's estate because Plaintiffs failed to bring this
case until after the applicable probate statute of limitations had run. Therefore, as the party
primarily responsible for the damages claimed by Plaintiffs, Dolezsar's absence will prevent the
Court from according complete relief among the other parties in this case. Consequently, as was
Clark's estate in the Turville case, the estate of Dolezsar is a necessary party to this action under
Rule 19(a).
B.

Dolezsar Is Indispensable Because This Action Cannot Proceed In Equity
And Good Conscience Without Him.

Where a necessary party cannot be feasibly joined, and the action cannot proceed "in
equity and good conscience" in his absence, the party is deemed "indispensible," and the action
"should be dismissed." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b). Rule 19(b) instructs the Court to consider the
following factors in deciding whether equity and good conscience require dismissal:
[FJirst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measure,
the prejudice can be lessoned or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added).
Applying these factors, the Turville court held that Clark's estate was an indispensible
party and, therefore, Digitized
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atffl[41-42. Clark's estate could no longer be joined to the action because the probate statute of
limitations had already run. Id. at \ 41. Because Clark was the "major" party responsible for the
alleged damages, the court concluded that "'a judgment rendered in [the Estate of Mr. Clark's]
absence w[ould] prejudice . .. those already parties' to the action" and "would be less than
adequate." Id. at \ 42. Additionally, as all claims against Clark's estate, whether those of the
plaintiff or those of the other defendants, were barred by the statute of limitations, "protective
judgment provisions would not ameliorate [the] prejudice." Id. Accordingly, the court held that
allowing the case to proceed despite the nonjoinder of Clark's estate "would violate the
principles of 'equity and good conscience.'" Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b)). Accordingly,
the court affirmed the dismissal of the case. M
As in the Turville case, the principles of equity and good conscience mandate that
Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims relating to the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development,
and the Springville Property be dismissed in Dolezsar's absence. Due to his untimely death,
Dolezsar cannot be joined to this action. Dolezsar's estate also cannot be joined because
Plaintiffs failed to bring this lawsuit within the period of limitations set forth in the Utah
Uniform Probate Code. See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a).
1.

Any Judgment Rendered in Dolezsar's Absence Will Result in
Unavoidable Prejudice to the Other Defendants in This Case.

Dolezsar is the central figure with respect to the fraud-based claims involving the Hawaii
Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property. Plaintiffs have
specifically alleged that all of the claimed misrepresentations made to Mower were
communicated to her by Dolezsar. Thus, as was Clark in Turville, Dolezsar is the "major" party
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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responsible for the damages alleged in the Complaint. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to
somehow impute any of Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the other defendants, they do
so based solely on hearsay statements made by Dolezsar. As a result of his death, the other
defendants will be unable to require Dolezsar to account for his alleged conduct at a deposition
or a trial in this matter. There are no protective provisions or other measures to remedy this
problem. Consequently, this action cannot proceed to a judgment in Dolezsar's absence without
resulting in unfair prejudice to the other defendants.
2.

Any Judgment Rendered in Dolezsar's Absence Will Be Inadequate.

Plaintiffs failed to bring this lawsuit before the statute of limitations expired with respect
to claims against Dolezsar's estate. As a result, neither Plaintiffs nor any of the defendants can
bring their related claims against Dolezsar's estate. Of course, the Hawaii Development
Defendants, the Mapleton Development Defendants, and the Springville Property Defendants
vigorously dispute that they made any misrepresentations to Dolezsar. To the extent liability
could somehow be imputed to them based on Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations, these
defendants would seek to assert cross-claims against Dolezsar's estate. However, because
Plaintiffs delayed in bringing this lawsuit until after the statute of limitations had run, any such
cross-claims would likely be barred. Accordingly, any judgment on the fraud-claims related to
the Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, or the Springville Property will be
inadequate.
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3.

Plaintiffs Will Retain Adequate Remedies After Dismissal of the
Dolezsar Fraud Claims.

Plaintiffs have asserted 48 causes of action in this case, including claims for breach of
contract, quasi contract, fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment in addition to their
fraud-based claims. These claims provide an adequate remedy for the wrongs alleged by
Plaintiffs in their Complaint. Moreover, any possible deficiency is the result of Plaintiffs' failure
to bring the fraud-based claims within the limitations period. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to
wait until after the central figure in the case can no longer be joined to seek recovery from others
who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him.
Accordingly, applying the factors outlined in Rule 19(b), the principles of equity and
good conscience dictate that Plaintiffs' fraud based claims related to the Hawaii Development,
the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property be dismissed in the absence of Dolezsar
and his estate, both indispensable parties to this action.
III.

PLAINTIFFS' FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM CONCERNING THE
DOUBLE T RANCH WATER PURCHASE MUST BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM.
"A party is liable for fraudulent nondisclosure if he 'omi[ts] . . . a material fact when

there is a duty to disclose, for the purpose of inducing action on the part of the other party, with
actual, justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party" Barber Bros. Ford, Inc. v.
Foianini, 2008 UT App 463, ^ 2 (emphasis added).
In Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water
Purchase, Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he
had used money from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares in the name of Defendant Wood
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Springs, as well as other alleged happenings subsequent to the alleged purchase. (Complaint fflf
1176-79.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege Mower relied on these alleged fraudulent
nondisclosures, or for that matter, how Mower could possibly have relied on these
nondisclosures — each of which allegedly took place after the purchase of the Double T Ranch
water shares — to her detriment. (Complaintfflf1176-79.) Instead, Plaintiffs simply allege that
Simpson's failure to disclose somehow damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of
$300,125.00. (Complaint 11182.)
Having failed to plead justifiable reliance resulting in damages, Plaintiffs' fraudulent
disclosure claim with respect to the Double T Ranch water shares fails as a matter of law. This
claim is nothing more than Plaintiffs' attempt to turn an alleged breach of fiduciary duty into a
fraud claim.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS5 AIDING AND ABETTING CLAIMS HAVE NOT BEEN
RECOGNIZED AS VALID CLAIMS UNDER UTAH LAW AND SHOULD BE
DISMISSED ACCORDINGLY.
In Claim Nos. 3, 5,13, and 15, Plaintiffs purport to allege claims for aiding and abetting

breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting fraudulent nondisclosure. However, claims for
aiding and abetting have not been recognized by Utah Courts. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT
App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable under Utah law). To the extent Plaintiffs wish to
broaden their net with respect to claims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, they should be
required to prove their claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act, which have been recognized as valid causes of action under Utah law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims should be dismissed
for failure to plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and failure to join an indispensible
party under Rule 19(b). Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud claims with respect to the alleged
purchase of water shares from Double T Ranch, as well as their "aiding and abetting" claims,
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law.
DATED t h i s Z ^ a y of April, 2010.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Craig Carlile
Caleb J. Frischknecht
Attorneys for Defendants
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Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
86 North University Avenue, #430
Provo,Utah 84601-4420
Telephone: (801)342-2400
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Michael K. Thompson, Todd
Dorny, Brandon Dente, ALS Properties, LLC, Mai Ke Kula, LLC, Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC,
KaMahina, LLC, He Kiakolu, LLC, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc.,
Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC,
DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton
Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows,
LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah,
LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, andKathyA. Templeman
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al.,
Defendants
and
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al.,
Rule 19 Defendants.

Civil No: 090403844
Judge: Samuel D. McVey

Pursuant to Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants David R.
Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Todd Dorny, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate,
Inc., Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ
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Development, LLC, DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN
Simpson Mapleton Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC,
Pheasant Meadows, LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC,
Landmark Homes of Utah, LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, and Kathy A. Templeman
(collectively, "Defendants"1) submit the following reply memorandum in support of their Motion
to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO MEET RULE
9(b)'S PLEADING STANDARD WITH LABELS AND CONCLUSIONS.
In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of failing to "read and

comprehend" Plaintiffs Compliant, which contains 361 pages and 1362 individually numbered
paragraphs, and of narrowly construing the Complaint "in the most narrow manner possible."
{See Mem. in Opp'n 65 9.) Plaintiffs essentially argue that the pleading deficiencies in their
fraud claims should be excused because the allegations in the Complaint "must be read broadly
and all reasonable inferences must be taken in Plaintiffs' favor." {See Mem. in Opp'n 9.)
However, "[the Rule 12(b) standard] does not apply to actions for fraud." DeBry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 1995). Rather, "Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Requires that fraud claims be pled with particularity." Id. Rule 9(b) imposes a "basic and
fundamental requirement... of clarity and conciseness," mandating that "the essential facts
upon which redress is sought be set froth with simplicity, brevity, clarity, and certainty so that it
can be determined whether there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed." Coroles v. Sabey,
2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 {quotingHeathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962)).
Mere pleading of labels and conclusions, such as "false statements" or "fraud," does not satisfy
this standard. Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of "labels and conclusions" that
"do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct").
As outlined below, Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum only highlights the deficiencies in
their fraud claims. Plaintiffs have now failed on their third attempt to properly plead their fraud
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claims. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss those claims with prejudice. U.S. ex rel Ritchie
v. LockheadMartin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2009) (denial of leave to amend
appropriate after "repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed"); see,
e.g., Roth v. Pederson, 2009 UT App 313 (affirming dismissal with prejudice of fraudulent
concealment claim for failure to plead with particularity).
A.

Plaintiffs Improperly Lump David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and Others
Together in Levying Allegations of Fraud.

The particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) "[are] especially important in cases
involving multiple defendants." Cook v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 424
(D. Utah 1986). "[E]ach defendant is entitled to know precisely what it is the plaintiff
claims he did wrong." Id. Accordingly, in its January 22, 2010 Order, the Court required
that Plaintiffs plead facts showing "who in particular said or represented what to whom in
particular." (January 22, 2010 Ruling Granting in Part the Various Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss (the "January 22, 2010 Order") ^f 2.) Lumping multiple defendants together
into allegations of fraud does not meet this requirement and constitutes grounds for
dismissal. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25 (dismissing with prejudice fraud claims
where plaintiffs failed on third attempt to "allege specifically the factual basis upon
which they charge each defendant with fraud." (emphasis added)).
Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs consistently lump David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson (and sometimes others) together in levying Plaintiffs' allegations of fraud. (See, e.g.,
Complaintffif542, 720, 726, 737, 743, 757-58,1014,1094,1096, and 1099.) As cited in
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Defendants' initial memorandum, paragraph 737 of the Complaint exemplifies this improper
practice:
737. David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and Ken Dolezsar also
represented to Leslie that the $6,800,000.00 would be specifically used to fund
development work at The Preserve at Mapleton development project, that she
would receive a first position deed of trust securing a promissory note and that
they would record the deed of trust in the office of the Utah County Recorder.
(Complaint f 737.) Plaintiffs fail to plead "who in particular" made the claimed
misrepresentations alleged in paragraph 737 and when such misrepresentations were
made. The importance of these missing details is highlighted by the fact that all of the
other claimed misrepresentations were allegedly made to Mower by Dolezsar "acting on
authorization and instructions from David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, or as part of a
conspiracy with David Simpson and Nathan Simpson." (See, e.g., Complaintffi[721,
731, 734, and 739.)
Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in paragraph 737 are proper because "David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, father and son, would speak for each other." (Mem. in
Opp'n 8.) Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff offers no authority and no explanation for this
proposition. Plaintiffs lumping of David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, and others in the
fraud allegations violates the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and constitutes grounds
for dismissal. See Cook, 645 F. Supp. at 424-25.
Plaintiffs also try to salvage the defective representations in Paragraph 737 by claiming
that they somehow "refer to the allegations contained in paragraph 736." (Mem. in Opp'n 8.) In
its entirety, paragraph 736 reads as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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736:
follows:

The representations described in paragraph 315 were false as

a.

The $6,800,000.00 loan could not be repaid in twelve

months; and
b.
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson could not pay
[Mower] $250,000.00 from the sale of each lot, nor did they intend to pay
[Mower] $250,000.00 from the sale of each lot.
(Complaint ^ 737.) Nothing in this paragraph, or in paragraph 737, suggests that the
alleged representations in paragraph 737 refer in any way to the allegations in paragraph
736. This after-the-fact attempt to prop up Plaintiffs' insufficient allegations should be
rejected.
B.

Plaintiffs' Fraud Claims Related to Magnet Bank Are Based on
Labels and Conclusions Rather Than Properly Pleaded Facts.

Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded a factual basis for their claim that the offers
referenced in the appraisal submitted by Free and Associates to Magnet Bank were "sham-realestate-transactions." (Complaint f 304.) Rather, Plaintiffs merely allege, "on information and
belief," that each of the approximately 15 offers were somehow "contrived sham transactions."
(Complaint ^ 304, 300-03.) However, fraud allegations made on information and believe are
sufficient for Rule 9(b) purposes only if Plaintiffs "includef] the facts upon which the belief is
based." Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App 313, p (citing Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App 86,
K 24, 69 P.3d 286); see also 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 9.03[l][g] (3d ed. 2010) ("Pleadings
alleging fraud usually may not be based on information and belief.").
Plaintiffs do not plead any facts demonstrating a basis for their "information and belief
that the offers were somehow "sham transactions." They simply assert the conclusion.
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Plaintiffs do not provide any additional basis for such "belief in their opposition memorandum,
in which they conclusorily claim that the offers "were not real offers" and that they must have
been made "with the intention of artificially raising the values of the real property." (Mem. in
Opp'n 12.) Moreover, other allegations in the Complaint directly contradict Plaintiffs' "belief
that the offers were "sham transactions." For example, Plaintiffs admit that because the debris
collection basin remains unfinished, "The Preserve at Mapleton development cannot be
completed," which would obviously prevent the offers from progressing to completed sales.
(See Complaint If 381.) Indeed, the Free and Associates appraisal specified that the offers would
not close until the lots were finished. (Mem. in Opp'n 10-11 ("Closing Date: Current Offer, to
close when lots are finished.").)
In short, Plaintiffs' fraud claim related to the offers referenced in the appraisal is based
merely on unsupported labels and conclusions, which are insufficient to satisfy the requirements
of Rule 9(b). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,1949-50 (2009) (condemning pleading of
"labels and conclusions" that "do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of
misconduct")
Plaintiffs' fraud allegations also fail with respect to the financial statements provided by
the Simpsons in connection with the Magnet Bank loan. Plaintiffs argue that even a "cursory
reading" of the 361-page Complaint would provide the details lacking in the allegations
contained within this claim for fraud in paragraph 176-780. Plaintiffs then refer the Court and
Defendants to allegations found in paragraphs 323-325 (a little more than halfway into the
general facts section), which Plaintiffs' claim supply the missing details. However, nowhere in
by the Howard
W. to
Hunter
Law Library, 323-325.
J. Reuben Clark
Law School, BYU.
paragraphs 767-780Digitized
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refer
paragraphs
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Plaintiffs expect the
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Court and Defendants to "sift[] through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain
whether Plaintiffs have allege[d] . . . facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."
Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, f 27. "This method for pleading fraud is unacceptable under rule
9(b), especially in a complaint of such enormous length." Id. at ^ 26.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert they have properly pleaded their fraud claim related to Defendant
Aviano's purchase of Lot 76 by arguing that "[t]here is no requirement that Plaintiffs show as
part of a fraud claim that Magnet Bank changed its position." (Mem. in Opp'n 14.) However,
this is the very essence of fraud under Utah law, which requires that Plaintiffs prove that they did
in fact rely on the alleged misrepresentations "and [were] thereby induced to a c t . . . to [their]
injury and damage" Giusti v. Sterling Wentworih Corp., 2009 UT 2, ^f 53 n.38, 201 P.3d 966;
see, e.g., Chang v. Soldier Summit Development, 1999 UT App 27, ^f 7 (affirming summary
judgment on fraud claim where only evidence of reliance was that plaintiffs "did not 'worry
about the progress of the project'"). Consequently, Plaintiffs must allege "what particular
damages were caused by each discrete action" taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations
to satisfy Rule 9(b). (January 22, 2010 Order.)
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts showing what damages were caused to Magnet Bank by
each discrete action allegedly taken in reliance on the claimed misrepresentation concerning the
price paid by Aviano. (See Complaintffi[794-811.) Plaintiffs allege that "[i]f Magnet Bank had
known the actual selling price, it would not have allowed the sale to go forward." (Complaint ^
806.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege what damages in particular were caused by Magnet
2

Defendants are unable to find any allegation in the Complaint that "had Magnet Bank and its participating bank
known the truth, they would have at the very least insisted on payment of the previously agreed release price of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
$1,020,000.00," as claimed
in Plaintiffs'Machine-generated
opposition memorandum.
(Mem. in Opp'n 15.)
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Bank's allowing the sale to go forward.3 Plaintiffs also allege that had Magnet Bank known the
alleged "true" purchase price, it would have "taken steps to protect the collateral and the loan"
and it "would have called the loan due." (Complaintffi[806, 808.) But, Plaintiffs do not allege
what damages resulted from Magnet Bank's not taking the unidentified steps to "protect the
collateral" and not calling the loan due.4 Indeed, with respect to damages concerning the Aviano
sale, Plaintiffs only generally allege as follows:
811. As a direct and proximate result of David Simpson's, Nathan
Simpson's and Michael Aviano's misrepresentations, as described in this cause of
action, Leslie, LD III and Navona were damaged in the amount of at least
$24,827,892.39.
(Complaint f 811.) This does not satisfy the mandate of Rule 9(b) and the Court's January 22,
2010 Order that Plaintiffs alleged "what particular damages were caused by each discrete action"
taken in reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.
Accordingly, the Magnet Bank fraud claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
C.

Plaintiffs Fail to Properly Plead Any Damages Resulting From the Alleged
Fraudulent Nondisclosures Concerning the Double T Ranch Water Purchase.
In its opening memorandum, Defendants argued that the fraud claims related to the

Double T Ranch Water Purchase should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to allege how the
claimed nondisclosures resulted in any damages. (Mem. in Supp. 14.) In response, Plaintiffs
Belying any damage claim in this regard, Plaintiffs have affirmatively pleaded that Magnet Bank "received
payment of $900,000.00 toward the purchase of Lot 67, but did not release its security interest." (Complaint ^f 410,
802.) Moreover, assuming Plaintiffs' allegations that the values of the lots were artificially inflated are true, Magnet
Bank was actually better off by receiving $900,000 instead of the "true" purchase price of $575,000.
4
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not explain what steps Magnet Bank would have taken to "protect the collateral,"
particularly in light of the fact that it did not release its security interest on the lot. (Complaint lfl[ 410.) Indeed,
Plaintiff LD III has since acquired fee title to the property in a trustee's sale. (Complaint 1f 426.) Plaintiffs also do
not explain how Magnet Bank would have been entitled to call the loan due. In reality, Magnet Bank began the
process of calling the loan due only one month after the Aviano sale, declaring in a letter that it would not renew the
loan. Magnet Bank eventually
received payment infiillfromNavona, demonstrating that Magnet Bank did not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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state that they "clearly allege that LD Ill's [and Mower's] funds were wrongfully taken, that they
were used to purchase water shares which were titled in an entity owned by David Simpson, that
LD III [and Mower] [were] never reimbursed for [their] funds and that the water shares were
sold and that LD III [and Mover] never received any proceeds." (Mem. in Opp'n 16.) Plaintiffs
further state that "[i]t is clear that LDIII and [Mower] were damaged in that their funds were
taken and never repaid. (Id.)
Tellingly, Plaintiffs make no attempt to explain how such damages resulted from the
alleged nondisclosures. Plaintiffs thereby confirm that their claims related to the Double T
Water Purchase have nothing to do with fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure
claim with respect to the Double T Ranch Waiter Purchase should be dismissed.
D.

Plaintiffs Have Not Pleaded the Required Particularity Within Their Fraud
Claims Concerning the Maple Mountain Water Project.
Plaintiffs fail to plead the necessary facts within their claims for fraud related to the

Maple Mountain Water Project. In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that they have
properly pleaded these claims, referring the Court to allegations contained in paragraph 479.
However, paragraph 479 is not referenced in Plaintiffs' fraud claim, which is found in Paragraph
1093-1107. Plaintiffs cannot expect the Court and Defendants to "sift[] through hundreds of
paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... facts necessary to
make all their elements of fraud." Coroles, 2003 UT App 339, \ 27. "This method for pleading
fraud is unacceptable under rule 9(b), especially in a complaint of such enormous length." Id. at
ffi[ 26-30 (affirming dismissal of fraud claim for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b)).
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The story told in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum is simply not apparent when reading the
fraud claim in the Complaint.
In summary, Plaintiffs have again failed to plead their fraud claims with the particularity
required under Rule 9(b) and should, therefore, be dismissed with prejudice.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATES THAT DOLESZAR IS AN
INDISPENSIBLE PARTY TO THIS CASE, REQUIRING DISMISSAL OF THE
FRAUD CLAIMS IN HIS ABSENCE.
A.

The Allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint Establish That Dolezsar Is the
Central Figure in This Case and Is Necessary to Its Just Adjudication.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that each of the alleged misrepresentations concerning the
Hawaii Development, the Mapleton Development, and the Springville Property were made to
Mower by Ken Dolezsar (Mower's late ex-husband). (See, e.g., Complaintfflf543, 721, 731,
734, 739, 757-58, 434, and 1014.) Yet, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants do not offer enough
support to show that Dolezsar is the central figure in this case. Plaintiffs claim that Dolezsar was
"[Mower's] husband and agent" and that he merely "relayed the misrepresentations made by
David Simpson, Nathan Simpson and others to [Mower]." (Mem. in Opp'n 18-19, 23.)
However, Plaintiffs cannot dispute their own allegations, which make clear that all of the
alleged misrepresentations were made to Mower by Dolezsar. In paragraph 739, for example,
Plaintiffs allege that "Ken Dolezsar, acting on authorization and instructions from David
Simpson and Nathan Simpson, or as part of a conspiracy with David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson, made the representations described in paragraph 316 herein to [Mower]." (Complaint
If 739.) Likewise, in paragraph 734, Plaintiffs allege that "Ken Dolezsar, acting either on the
authorization and instructions of David Simpson and Nathan Simpson or as part of a conspiracy
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with the Simpsons, made the representations to [Mower] described in paragraph 315."
(Complaint ^ 734.) Plaintiffs' own allegations thus establish that Dolezsar is the central figure in
this case, and not merely a "go between" as argued in Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum. (See
Mem. inOpp'n23.)
In this regard, Dolezsar is just like Clark in the recent Utah Court of Appeals case of
Turville v. J & J Properties, L. C., 2006 UT App 305,1445 P.3d 1146. As the person with whom
the plaintiff had primarily dealt, Clark occupied a "pivotal representative role . . . in the
transactions at issue." Id. at Yl 3-6, 39.5 As the alleged damages resulted primarily from Clark's
actions, the Court concluded that Clark was a necessary party because "complete relief [could
not] be accorded to those already parties" in his absence. Id. \ 39-40.
Likewise, complete relief cannot be accorded to those already parties in this case without
Dolezsar. As did Clark in the Turville case, Dolezsar played a "pivotal representative role" in
the transactions at issue in this case. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar made all of the alleged
misrepresentations of which Plaintiffs' complain. Plaintiffs have not cited a single instance in
which David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or any of the other Defendants made a
misrepresentation directly to Mower. Rather, Plaintiffs claim David Simpson and Nathan
Simpson "authorized and instructed" Dolezsar to make the alleged misrepresentations to Mower.
(See, e.g., Complaintffi[731, 734, 739.) However, Plaintiffs have not alleged any factual basis
for what David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, or others may or may not have said to Dolezsar.
Plaintiffs apparently rely in this regard on hearsay statements from Dolezsar. This further

5
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W.memorandum.
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law
representative role" inDigitized
Defendants'
opening
(Mem.
in Supp.
17.)School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

demonstrates that Dolezsar is the central figure in this case and that Plaintiffs5 alleged damages
resulted primarily from his actions. See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, \ 40. Consequently, as was
the case in Turville, the "interest of fairness to the parties in [this] litigation'5 dictates that
Dolezsar be treated as a necessary party. Id.
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the Turville case on the basis that Clark was actually
named as a defendant in the complaint before he died. This distinction is without a difference.
Whether a person is a necessary party under Rule 19(a) cannot turn merely on whether the
plaintiff names such person as a defendant. Otherwise, plaintiffs could control the outcome of
Rule 19 analysis merely by declining to name an otherwise necessary party as a defendant.
Moreover, as they allege that Dolezsar made all of the representations of which they complain as
part of a conspiracy to defraud Mower and her companies, Plaintiffs surely would have named
Dolezsar as a defendant had they filed this case before he died or during the limitations period
for joining his estate under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a). That Clark happened to die after the
Turville complaint was filed does not make him any more necessary under Rule 19(a) than
Dolezsar.
For all of these reasons, Dolezsar is a necessary party to the just adjudication of this case.
B.

Application of the Factors in Rule 19(b) Demonstrates that Plaintiffs' Fraud
Claims Cannot Proceed in Equity and Good Conscience in Dolezsar's
Absence.

The Court considers the following factors to determine "whether in equity and good
conscience [Plaintiffs' fraud claims] should proceed" in Dolezsar's absence:
[FJirst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; second the extent to which, by
protective provisions
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the prejudice can be lessoned or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in
the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule itself "does not state what weight is to be
given each factor," the Court "must determine the importance of each factor on the facts of each
particular case and in light of equitable considerations." Glenny v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 494
F.2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974).
Under the circumstances of this case, the prejudice that will result to Defendants if
Plaintiffs' fraud claims are allowed to proceed in the absence of Dolezsar and his estate requires
that the fraud claims be dismissed.
1.

Defendants Will Be Unfairly Prejudiced If Plaintiffs Are Allowed to
Proceed With Their Fraud Claims in Dolezsar's Absence.

The Turville case recently decided by the Utah Court of Appeals is directly on point with
respect to the issue of prejudice to Defendants. In Turville, the court relied heavily on two facts
in holding that Clark was an indispensable party. Turville, 2006 UT App 305, Yi 41-42. First,
Clark was "the major, if not the sole, actor responsible for Plaintiffs' alleged damages." Second,
the plaintiffs failed to join Clark while he was alive and failed to join his estate within the
limitations period after his death. Id. Under these circumstances, the court found that it was
unfair and prejudicial to require the other defendants to defend the case in Clark's absence. Id.
In this case, Defendants will likewise be unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in
the absence of Dolezsar, the central party responsible for the damages alleged by Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have specifically alleged that all of the claimed misrepresentations were made to
Mower by Dolezsar. Plaintiffs do not cite a single instance in which any of the Defendants made
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a false or misleading representation directly to Mower. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to impute
any of Dolezsar's alleged misrepresentations to the other defendants, they apparently do so based
solely on hearsay statements made by Dolezsar. As a practical matter, these inadmissible
hearsay statements will not be considered as evidence in this case. Moreover, Plaintiffs will be
unable to question Dolezsar concerning his alleged misrepresentations. Gardiner v. Virgin
Islands Water & Power Auth, 145 F.3d 635, 641 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing possibility for
prejudice resulting from inability to collect evidence from absent party). Under these
circumstances, which are indistinguishable from those at issue in Turville, it is simply unfair and
prejudicial to require Defendants to defend against Plaintiffs' fraud claims in Dolezsar's absence.
See Turville, 2006 UT App 305, \ 40 (citing Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) for
the proposition that Rule 19 "seeks to protect the interest of fairness to the parties as well as the
interest of judicial economy").
Moreover, should the Court allow Plaintiffs' fraud claims to proceed without Dolezsar.
Defendants will be at risk of incurring, double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, at 110 (1968) ("[T]he
defendant may properly wish to avoid multiple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole
responsibility for a liability he shares with another.") The one year statute of limitations set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a) applies to claims against the estate, but not claims brought by
the estate on behalf of Dolezsar. In fact, under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-108, the applicable
statutes of limitations on any claims held by Dolezsar at his death were automatically tolled for a
period of 12 months. Accordingly, Dolezsar's estate is not precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 75-3the HowardDefendants
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because Plaintiffs failed to bring this action against Dolezsar's estate within the limitations
period under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(a), Defendants are unable to assert their related claims
against Dolezsar. Consequently, Defendants are not only at risk of incurring multiple or
inconsistent obligations in subsequent litigation, but they would be precluded from asserting
their claims against the estate in any such proceeding. This unfair prejudice must be prevented.
Plaintiffs argue that Dolezsar is not an indispensable party, citing to the general rule that
"Rule 19 does not require the joinder of joint tortfeasors . . . or parties against whom [the parties]
have claim for contribution." (Mem. in Opp'n *([ 27-28, quoting Nottingham v. Gen. Am.
Commons Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir. 1987).) However, as outlined above, Dolezsar is
not a mere joint tortfeasor, but is the party primarily responsible for the alleged fraudulent
conduct of which Plaintiffs' complain. The Utah Court of Appeals recognized in Turville that
situations like those of Clark and Dolezsar are not governed by the general rule. See Turville,
2006 UT App 305, ^f 40; see also Freeman v. Northwest Acceptance Corp., 754 F.2d 553, 559
(5th Cir. 1985) (dismissing case where absent subsidiary company was "more than an active
participant in the [wrong] alleged by [the plaiintiffs]; it was the primary participant."). This case
is indistinguishable from the Turville case and, therefore, requires the same result — dismissal
for failure to join Dolezsar during the limitations period.
2.

Prejudice to Defendants Cannot Be Avoided By Any Protective
Measures.

Plaintiffs do not address the second factor listed in Rule 19(b), and therefore concede that
the prejudice which would result to Defendants if Plaintiffs' fraud claims proceed in Dolezsar's
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absence cannot be avoided by any protective provisions in a potential judgment or other
measures.
3.

The Court Cannot Render An Adequate Judgment on Plaintiffs
Fraud Claims in Dolezsar's Absence.

The third factor listed in Rule 19(b) — whether a judgment rendered in the person's
absence will be adequate — "refer[s] to [the] public stake in settling disputes by wholes,
whenever possible." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 111. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs incorrectly
argue that whether a judgment is adequate should be determined from the Plaintiffs' point of
view, claiming that Plaintiffs will have an adequate remedy without the joinder of Dolezsar or
his estate. (Mem. in Opp'n 28.) The Tenth Circuit has heard and rejected this argument. See
Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282, 1292-93(10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that a judgment would be adequate because it would afford the plaintiffs complete
relief).
Applying the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Provident Tradesmens
demonstrates that any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's absence would be inadequate.
Dolezsar's estate is not precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 from bringing claims
related to the alleged fraud against Defendants in further proceedings, thereby subjecting
Defendants to risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations. Moreover, because Plaintiffs
did not timely join the estate to this proceeding, this Court cannot hear Defendants' claims
against Dolezsar relating to the alleged fraud. Therefore, any judgment rendered in Dolezsar's
absence will be inadequate.
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4.

Plaintiffs Have An Adequate Remedy In This Case.

Upon dismissal of their fraud claims, Plaintiffs will still have some 48 causes of action in
this case, including claims for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust
enrichment. Plaintiffs argue that these claims do not provide a remedy for their fraud
allegations. However, any deficiency in this regard results solely from Plaintiffs' failure to join
Dolezsar's estate within the applicable limitations period The Court should not allow Plaintiffs
to wait until after the central figure in this case can no longer be joined to seek recovery from
others who are alleged only to have acted in concert with him. Accordingly, the Court should
assign little weight to this factor, particularly when compared to the prejudice that will be
experienced if Plaintiffs fraud claims are allowed to go forward in Dolezsar's absence. See
Turville, 2006 UT App 305, ^ 41-42 (declining to consider the plaintiffs lack of adequate
remedy in similar circumstances).
Therefore, considering the factors set forth in Rule 19(b), Plaintiffs' fraud claims cannot
proceed in equity and good conscience in the absence of the Dolezsar and his estate and must be
dismissed accordingly.
in.

THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT
NONDISCLOSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE DOUBLE T RANCH WATER
PURCHASE.
In their opposition memorandum, Plaintiffs contend that proving reliance is not required

to recover on a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure, citing to the case of Yazd v. Woodside Homes
Corp, 2006 UT 46. Plaintiffs are correct that Yazd does not use the word "reliance" in listing the
elements of fraudulent nondisclosure. Id. \ 10. However, the concept of reliance is clearly
embodied in the first
element listed by the Yazd court: "a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
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nondisclosed information is material

" Id. The Yazd court defined materiality as "something

which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of.. .
importance in determining whether to buy or sell." Id. at f 32. In other words, the fact must
have been important enough that its nondisclosure would "induce action on the part of the other
party, with actual justifiable reliance resulting in damage to that party." Barber Bros. Ford, Inc.
v. FoianinU 2008 UT App 463,12. 6
In Plaintiffs' fraudulent nondisclosure claim related to the Double T Ranch Water
Purchase, Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson fraudulently failed to disclose to Mower that he
had used money from Plaintiff LD III to purchase water shares in the name of Defendant Wood
Springs, as well as other alleged happenings subsequent to the alleged purchase. (Complaint ^
1176-79.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege that these nondisclosures induced any action or
influenced any decision by Mower. Plaintiffs simply allege that Simpson's failure to disclose
somehow damaged Mower and LD III in the amount of $300,125.00. (Complaint ^ 1182.)
These allegations do not support a claim for fraud and should, therefore, be dismissed.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CREATE NEW CAUSES OF ACTION
FOR AIDING AND ABETTING, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN RECOGNIZED AS
VALID CLAIMS UNDER UTAH LAW.
Plaintiffs admit that the Utah Supreme Court has not yet recognized civil causes of action

for aiding and abetting. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to
decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable
under Utah law. The process of creating new law should left to the Utah Supreme Court. To the

6

Plaintiffs complain of Defendants' citation to the unpublished Foianini case. However, Rule 30(f) of the Utah
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extent Plaintiffs wish to broaden their net with respect to claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud, they should be required to prove their claims for conspiracy and violation of the Utah
Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, which have been recognized as valid causes of action under
Utah law.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' fraud-based claims should be dismissed
for failure to plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) and failure to join an indispensible
party under Rule 19(b). Additionally, Plaintiffs' fraud claims with respect to the alleged
purchase of water shares from Double T Ranch, as well as their "aiding and abetting" claims,
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Utah law.
DATED this today of May, 2010.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Craig Carlile
Caleb J. Frischknecht
Attorneys for Defendants
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that will be fine.
MR. JENNINGS:

And again, I feel I should get the

opportunity to reply to the argument that 9(b) is the
standard, ITm not saying itfs not.

But 9(b) interplays with

12(b) which interplays with 8.
THE COURT:
argument on that.

Well, okay.

I understand what you1re saying.

MR. JENNINGS:
THE COURT:
Mr. Carlile.

Well, I understand your

Thank: you, Your Honor.

But I am inclined to agree with

Fraud is —

fraud and a mutual mistake are

peculiar animals, and they have to be pled with
particularity.

You get a lot more inferences under Rule

12(b) then you do under 9(b). Okay?
So okay.

Thatfs my position.

All right.
The Court's prepared to rule in this case.

I

appreciate the memoranda that have been submitted and the
arguments of counsel.

I have read all of those.

read through the Second Amended Complaint.
—

I have

And let me state

let me first go through the items addressed by

Mr. Carlile.
The Court is going the grant the motion to dismiss
the fraud-based claims, and I will do that —
here —

I don't want to go —

I won't stay

rehash all of those reasons,

but in addition to what Mr. Carlile said, there's another
reason.
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1

The plaintiff in this case, the live breathing

2

plaintiff, Ms. Mower, was directly privy to what was said to

3

her.

4

was —

5

have occurred, when it would have occurred, what words were

6

used, who else was present, all those types of things that

7

the Court indicated in its prior rulings.

8

not included in the Complaint, and that would be an

9

additional reason for finding that there was no

10
11

She has all of that information in her knowledge.
she was there.

She

I mean, she knows where that should

Those things were

particularity.
Also, I do believe that this Complaint was a big

12

huge improvement over the last one, but still there are

13

circumstances where there were not references to earlier

14

facts that were pleaded, and I do not believe that counsel

15

and the Court should have to guess where those facts are

16

coming from or go back and research where those facts are

17

coming from.

18

cause of action, but that!s just redundant.

19

something that Mr. Carlile had already addressed.

20

Those should be identified and included in the
That's

With respect to the Double T claim, I would also

21

note that there is a failure to state a claim in that there

22

was no alleged reliance, or action, or inaction, change of

23

position based on what was allegedly conferred.

24
25

And with respect to the Rule 19(b), Ifm going to
actually reserve ruling on that.

I want to look at that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

183

1

some more.

2

the Turville case and so forth, but I would like to review

3

further and make a determination on that.

4

I did read through the memoranda.

I did read

Let's see, the aiding and abetting claims are

5

dismissed.

The Court is not going to create a new cause of

6

action; that is not the Court's province.

7

the supreme court would do in this circumstance, maybe they

8

would follow the 56 percent of the states that are doing

9

that, maybe they wouldn't, it's very difficult to say.

I don't know what

10

that would not be something I would be inclined to go

11

forward on.

12

Let's see

13

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

14

But

—
Is that with prejudice, Your

Honor?

15

THE COURT:

I'm getting there, okay, I'm getting

16

there.

17

think those cover the arguments by Mr. Carlile.

18

It's without legal amend, let me say that.

So I

Okay.

Now, let's turn over to Mr. Nemelka here.
Okay.

Find my

19

notes.

The fraud claims against Mr. Nemelka are not

20

pled with particularity for the reasons that have been

21

stated; however, with respect to the conspiracy and

22

injunction matter, again, injunction is a remedy but it's

23

pled as a cause of action.

24

I don't weigh the evidence on a motion to dismiss and say,

25

yeah, there's grounds for an injunction here or not.

So it's pled.

I don't weigh
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All I
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look at is the allegations and say are the elements pled,
they're pled.

So I'm not going to dismiss the injunction

claim.
Same thing with the conspiracy because it's not a
fraud-based claim, it's relating to an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty and a conspiracy to do that.
think there's —

Again, I don't

I mean, if all of this evidence was proved,

I think you'd have a hard time selling this to a finder of
fact; but nonetheless, you have the opportunity to try.
So again, I'm not weighing the evidence here, I'm
not saying that the claim is valid.

All I'm saying is it

was pled and that's all I'm saying.

So you do have —

so

you do have those claims with respect to Mr. Nemelka.
And the same —

and then also, I believe, you had

him enjoined in the UPUA claim, right?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
THE COURT:

Correct.

So same thing on the UPUA.

Again,

they're not alleging the fraud-based claim under the UPUA,
they're saying they're just going after the fiduciary duty
issue.

So that claim survives, that was pled.
The same —

the same reasoning would apply to

Mr. Carlson on the conspiracy and the UPUA, and then the
injunctive claim.

The same would apply to

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
THE COURT:

—

—

Mr. Hakes.

Mr. Hakes and his related entity.
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1

With respect to Mr. Aviano, the fraud claim is not

2

properly plead.

3

in addition to what was stated in counsel's briefs, today we

4

find out outside the Complaint that we do know who this

5

deputy assessor is.

6

information's not included.

7

would create the —

8
9

It's not pled with particularity.

I am — .

We were introduced to him, but that
So it's things like that that

create the issue here.

I recognize plaintiffs' concern with not being able
to put everything in here because they don't know yet.

I

10

mean, they don't know all that yet.

11

that they do know they don't put in the Complaint, at least

12

to the extent that they know them.

13

the Court.

14

The fact is the things

So that's the concern of

But again, with Mr. Aviano, I believe that the

15

conspiracy, the UPUA and the negligent misrepresentation

16

claims have been adequately pled and would survive in this

17

case.

18

claims are or anything of that nature, but merely stating

19

that they've set out a claim in the Complaint.

20

Again, not passing judgment on the how strong those

So there will not be leave to amend in this case,

21

this would be going on our third —

22

says we'd be down the road on this quite a ways.

23

get going on this case.

24
25

well, as Mr. Carlile
We need to

So plaintiff will be allowed to try and prove their
causes of action for the things such as conversion, and I
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believe that they will have —

and those other matters, I

believe they will have the opportunity to do that; breach of
fiduciary duty, the contract claims and so forth, they'll be
allowed to do that.

And if those can survive summary

judgment, then they will be able to present those at trial.
So that would be the ruling of the Court in this
case.

I wondered if, Mr. Carlile, if you would mind

preparing an order in this case?
MR. CARLILE:
THE COURT:

I will.

And submitting that to counsel.

again, I appreciate —
today.

And

I appreciate what everyone said here

I thought that I was persuaded by everybody's

arguments, but I believe I've made the right decision.
Mr. Jennings?
MR. JENNINGS:

Your Honor, we would ask that you

certify the dismissal of the aiding and abetting claims as
final orders.
THE COURT:

I'm not going to do that because you

have to comply with Rule —
—

it's not under Rule —

well, I don't even think you can

well, you'd have to comply with

Rule 54 on that, okay, if you want to do that.

Okay?

And if you want to do that, we can look at that
because I want the other side to be able to look at that,
all right, and make an objection.

So look under Rule 54(b),

I believe it is, for a motion for certification and I'll be
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1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2 I STATE OF UTAH
)

3 | COUNTY OF UTAH

)

4
5 I
6

This is to certify that the foregoing proceedings
were transcribed by me, Matthew B. Rose, RPR, a Certified

7 I Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah;

10 I

That the proceedings were reported by me in

11

stenotype from an audio recording and thereafter caused by

12

me to be transcribed into typewriting; and that said

13

transcript contains all of the evidence, objections of

14

counsel and rulings of the Court and all matters to which

15

the same relate; and that the foregoing pages constitute a

16 I true and accurate transcription of said proceedings.
17
18 |

DATED this 25th day of November, 2010.

19
20
21
22 _
23 |

MATTHEW B. ROSE, RPR, CSR
UT NO. 5965543-7801

24
25
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4TH DISTRICT* V
STATE OF UTAH 1/
u w i COUNTY

Craig Carlile (0571)
Caleb J. Frischknecht (11648)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
86 North University Avenue, #430
Provo,Utah 84601-4420
Telephone: (801) 342-2400
Attorneys for Defendants David R. Simpson, Nathan R. Simpson, Michael K. Thompson, Todd
Dorny, Brandon Dente, ALS Properties, LLC, Mai Ke Kula, LLC, Hanalei Kai Holdings, LLC,
Ka Mahina, LLC, He Kiakolu, LLC, Koamalu Plantation, LLC, Landmark Real Estate, Inc.,
Wood Springs, LLC, Oak Leaf, LLC, Dente, LLC, Sunny Ridge, LLC, KNDJ Development, LLC,
DN Simpson Holdings, LLC, SOS Mapleton Development, LLC, DN Simpson Mapleton
Holdings, LLC, The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, Pheasant Meadows,
LLC, Carnesecca Orchard Estates, LLC, Spanish Vista Plat I, LLC, Landmark Homes of Utah,
LLC, Maple Mountain Water Tank, LLC, and Kathy A. Templeman
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT
LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al.,
Plaintiff,
v.

RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al.,
Defendants
and
KOAMALU PLANTATION INVESTMENT,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, et al.,
Rule 19 Defendants.

Civil No: 090403844
Judge: Samuel D. McVey

Before the Court are the following motions to dismiss related to the Second Amended
Complaint: Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (the "Simpson Motion"); Defendant
Michael W. Aviano's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint (the "Aviano
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Motion"); Defendant Chad D. Carlson's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint (the "Carlson Motion"); and Defendant David Nemelka's Motion to Dismiss (the
"Nemelka Motion").
After careful review of the memoranda and authorities submitted by the parties, and
having heard oral argument concerning the matters, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud-based
claims (Claim Nos. 1, 4, 5, 11, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 29, and 321), as well as Plaintiffs' claims for
conspiracy (Claim Nos. 9, 19,25, and 30) and violation of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Act (Claim Nos. 10 and 20) to the extent they are based on allegations offraud,for failure to
plead with particularity as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Court previously
dismissed all of the fraud allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to meet
the pleading standards under Rule 9(b), but allowed Plaintiffs one more chance to plead its fraud
claims concisely and with particularity. Despite Plaintiffs' addition of 145 more pages, the
Second Amended Complaint still does not provide the particularity mandated by Rule 9(b).
Instead, Plaintiffs' "much too long and involved" Second Amended Complaint merely "dumps
upon the [Court]... the burden of sifting through the hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to
ascertain whether Plaintiffs have allege[d]... the facts necessary to make all their elements of
fraud." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,1ff[ 23, 27, 79 P.3d 974 (internal quotations
omitted). Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the memoranda supporting the Simpson
Motion, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs'fraud-basedclaims without leave to amend.

1

The Court will also dismiss Claim No. 32 for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Claim No. 32
is afraudulentnondisclosure claim. Yet, Plaintiffs fail to allege that any of the facts Defendants allegedly failed to
disclose induced any action or influenced any decision of Plaintiffs.
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Additionally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting (Claim Nos.
3, 5,13, and 15) for failure to state a claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Utah Supreme
Court has not yet recognized a claim for aiding and abetting under Utah law, and the Court
declines to do so here. See Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974 (declining to
decide whether claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and fraud are cognizable
under Utah law).
The Court has taken under advisement the issues raised in the Simpson Motion under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) and will issue a ruling after further review.
The Court denies the Aviano Motion, the Carlson Motion, and the Nemelka Motion with
respect to Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim related to the Mapleton development (Claim No. 19), to
the extent such claim is based on alleged breaches of fiduciary duties, which are not subject to
the particularity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Likewise, the Nemelka Motion is denied
with respect to Plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (Claim No. 20),
insofar as that claim is not based on allegations of fraud. Finally, the Court denies the Aviano
Motion with respect to Plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepresentation concerning the Mapleton
development, which claim the Court finds is not subject to the particularity requirements of Utah
R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth above, and those stated by the Court from the
bench during the May 13,2010 hearing in this matter,

2

To the extent alleged against Defendants Carlson, 2 Brothers Communication, Allen Hakes, Lonestar Gutters,
LLC, Dallas Hakes, Lonestar Builders, LLC, and Aviano, Plaintiffs' Claim No. 20 is based entirely on Plaintiffs'
inadequatefraudallegations. Accordingly, Claim No. 20 shall be dismissed in its entirety with respect to these
defendants, for the reasons set forth above.
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claim Nos. 1,4, 5,11, 14,15, 21,24,26, 29, and 32 in
the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
for failure to meet the pleading standard found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Nos. 9,10,19,25, and 30 in the Plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND to the extent
those claims are based on allegations of fraud for failure to meet the pleading standard found in
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 20 in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND with
respect to Defendants Carlson, 2 Brothers Communication, Allen Hakes, Lonestar Gutters, LLC,

1

Dallas Hakes, Lonestar Builders, LLC, and Aviano for failure to meet the pleading standard
found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim No. 20 in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND with respect to the remaining
Defendants to the extent Claim No. 20 is based on allegations of fraud for failure to meet the

A

pleading standard found in Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claim Nos. 3, 5,13,15, and 32 are DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) for failure to state a claim upon

*

which relief can be granted.
1
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

a

LESLIE D. MOWER, an individual; et al.,
RULING AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
FRAUD CLAIMS IN SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER RULE
19

Plaintiff,
v.

DAVID R. SIMPSON, an individual; et al,
Case No: 090403844
Defendants
Judge Samuel D. McVey

And
KOAMALU PLANTATION
INVESTMENT, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company, et al.,
Rule 19 Defendants

The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and having carefully reviewed the
motion and memoranda submitted by counsel makes the following Ruling and Order.
I. Procedural History
The current case was filed in October, 2009. On March 5, 2010, Ms. Mower and the
other plaintiffs ("Ms. Mower") filed a Second Amended Complaint. On April 13,2010, the
Simpson defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint including an argument that the estate of Mr. Dolezsar, Ms. Mower's deceased
husband who died on November 15, 2007, should have been joined as a necessary and
indispensable party. On April 26, 2010, Ms. Mower filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
Simpson Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. On May 6,
2010, the Simpson Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint. The Court heard oral argument and took the issue under
advisement.
II. Analysis
The Simpson and related defendants (the "Simpsons"), argue plaintiffs fraud claims
should be dismissed under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(b) as Ken Dolezsar is a
necessary and indispensible party to this case and cannot now be joined because the statute of
limitations in which to sue his estate has run. The Simpsons support this argument by citing
Turville v. J&J Properties, L.C9145 P.3d 1146 (Utah App. 2006). Turville quotes from Seftel v.
Capital City in setting out the required steps for a case to be dismissed under Rule 19(b). Seftel
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v. Capital CityJBank, 767 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah App. 1989). First, a court must determine if a
party "has sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary party." Id. Second, if the court
has held the party is necessary, and joinder is not feasible, the court must determine whether a
party is indispensable. See id. To determine if a party is indispensable, the court considers the
four factors found in Rule 19(b):
1) To what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to
him or those already parties.
2) The extent to which the prejudice can be lessened or avoided.
3) Whether a judgment rendered in a person's absence will be adequate.
4) Whether a plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
Simpsons compare Mr. Dolezsar in the present case to Mr. Clark in Turville as one who
occupied a pivotal representative role. Mr. Clark actively participated in a scheme to defraud
other parties and was the figure in the scheme who withheld material information from and
made false representations to property owners. Like Mr. Clark in Turville, Mr. Dolezsar was the
person with whom Ms. Mower dealt. Ms. Mower does not dispute that Dolezsar passed all of the
allegedly fraudulent information to her. Ms. Mower does not cite an instance where Simpsons
directly made a misrepresentation to her. Additionally, there is no factual basis in the complaint
for what, if anything, Simpsons actually told Mr. Dolezsar and no way of determining the
accuracy of any information Mr. Dolezsar may have passed to Ms. Mower from Simpsons. This
is one of the problems with the fraud allegation in the Complaint. What Mr. Doleszar
specifically told Ms. Mower and how and where he said it is presumably known only to her, but
none of her complaints identify it with particularity.
Ms. Mower does not contest the inability to join Dolezsar's estate due to the statute of
limitations but disagrees Turville is applicable to the present case. Ms. Mower states the only
similarity Turville and the present matter is someone died and thus could not be joined. Ms.
Mower attempts to distinguish Mr. Dolezsar from Mr. Clark, the Turville party, by referring to
Mr. Dolezsar as a simple go-between while Mr. Clark was a principle perpetrator of fraud.
However, Ms. Mower previously admitted more than this. In the Second Amended Complaint,
Ms. Mower acknowledged all the alleged misrepresentations from Simpsons were made by Mr.
Dolezsar to Ms. Mower, and Mr. Dolezsar may have been acting as part of the alleged
conspiracy. Again, she does not give sufficient particulars even though she is presumably the
only one with specific knowledge, and omitted an adequate explanation of why she did not share
that knowledge in her serial complaints.
Additionally, Ms. Mower claims Simpsons do not meet the standard for Rule 19 as stated
in Grand County v. Rogers, 44 P. 3d 734 (Utah 2002). In Grand County, the court determined
the burden was on the party attempting to persuade the court to present specific facts. Id at 741.
Ms. Mower claims Simpsons did not present specific facts sufficient to meet the Rule 19
standard. However, Simpsons accurately presented the facts alleged in the Second Amended
Complaint, noting that all of the alleged fraudulent information passed to Ms. Mower came via
Mr. Dolezsar, and Mr. Dolzesar may have been part of the alleged conspiracy.
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In the present case, the Court finds the Second Amended Complaint alleges, at least m
the alternative, Mr. Dolezsar acted as more than a simple go-between. He occupied a pivotal
representative role in the alleged fraud. In his absence, complete relief would not be available
for those who are already parties because of the inability to hold him accountable as well as the
other reasons identified by Simpsons. There is, therefore, sufficient interest to make him a party
to this action. The statute of limitations as found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1) (a) - (b)
(1993)) has already run and Mr. Dolezsar cannot be joined unless Ms. Mower presented an
exception to tolling the limitations period, which she has not attempted to do. Thus, the Court
will look to the Rule 19(b) factors to determine whether Mr. Dolezsar is an indispensable party.
No Rule 19 factor is determinative and each must be given weight appropriate to the facts of this
case. Glenny v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 494 F. 2d 651, 653 (10th Cir. 1974).
First, the Court must determine to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties to the action. Ms. Mower claims
Mr. Dolezsar is simply a joint tortfeasor and his absence would not unfairly prejudice any current
parties. Simpsons properly assert Mr. Dolezsar is more than a mere joint tortfeasor and is one of
the major actors in this case—potentially one who self-dealt and defrauded others; all the
allegedly fraudulent statements were made to Ms. Mower by Mr. Dolezsar. The Defendants will
be unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar because of, for
example, their inability to cross claim against him.
Second, the Court must decide the extent to which the prejudice can be mitigated. Ms.
Mower made no argument concerning this factor, however Simpsons properly noted the
prejudice can be avoided by dismissing the claims for fraud.
Third, the Court must ascertain whether a judgment rendered in a person's absence will
be adequate. Ms. Mower claims the Court should consider adequacy of judgment from the
Plaintiffs point-of-view. In Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d 1282,1292-93 (10th Cir. 2003) the
Tenth Circuit addresses adequacy not from the standpoint of the plaintiff, but by evaluating the
quality of the resolution of the dispute. Id. In looking at the resolution, judgment rendered
without Mr. Dolezsar would be inadequate because, among other things mentioned by Simpsons,
no cross claims can now be brought against his estate.
Finally, the Court must determine whether a plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
action is dismissed for nonjoinder. Dismissal of the fraud claims will not affect Ms. Mower's
claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust enrichment. The
Court is well aware these claims may not perfectly protect Ms. Mower's interests were all of the
facts alleged to be proved. (The Court previously ruled, however, inadequate facts regarding
fraud were alleged by plaintiffs.) In the absence of Mr. Dolezsar and with the inability to join his
estate as a party at this juncture, the remaining claims must suffice.
Based on the above analysis and all other reasons stated by Simpsons, the Court finds
Simpsons would be substantially prejudiced by proceeding with the fraud claims in the absence
of Mr. Dolezsar. Mr. Dolezsar played a key role in the communication of the information which
is claimed to form the basis of the alleged fraud in this action. The Court cannot conclude an
adequate resolution to the claims for fraud may be reached in the absence of Mr. Dolezsar's
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estate, and the only way to mitigate the resulting prejudice to Simpsons is to dismiss the claims
for fraud. Ms. Mower's remaining claims provide an adequate remedy for the injuries of which
she complains.
III. Conclusion
The Simpson defendant's Motion to Dismiss fraud claims in the Second Amended
Complaint on the basis of Rule 19 is GRANTED.
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